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"Born a mutant, gifted with the ability to command air-current in the area
around her she took the name Windfall. Withdrawn and easily led, Wendy was
always reluctant to commit a crime .. 
INTRODUCTION
Law students are typically introduced to the concept of windfall gains early
on in their legal careers, usually during a first-year Contracts class.2 When
1. Windfall (comic book character) - Comic Vine, available at http://www.comicvine.com/windfall/
29-31287 (last visited August 11, 2009) (describing the sometimes DC Comics heroine Windfall, who
led a life marked by swings in good fortune, belonging to the evil gang Masters of Disaster before
joining Batman and the Outsiders).
2. See Mark P. Gergen, Restitution as a Bridge Over Troubled Contractual Waters, 71 FoRPtAM L.
REv. 709, 733-34 (2002) (retelling the quintessential case of Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining
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sorting through the proper remedies for contract breach, students learn that the
proper remedy will be one that does not produce a windfall, even if the law
must take a stroll through equity doctrines 3 to avoid such a result.4 In other
words, a party, even an aggrieved party, is not legally entitled to a windfall,
notwithstanding the fact that a windfall would be the natural result of an
automatic enforcement of a contract or a common law rule.5 An extension of
this legal-truth, that no one is entitled to a windfall, is that windfalls are not
legally desirable or even legal at all and that the law may require some
intervention in order to prevent this unmerited gain from happening. Further-
more, in court, once a judge classifies an economic gain as a windfall, that gain
is then unlawful and will be prohibited.6 However, judicial intervention that
necessarily disrupts what the parties bargained for ex-ante, then creates an
arguable windfall for the person receiving relief from a bad bargain.7
Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1963) in which the court would not give the landowners a windfall). As
further support for this proposition, note that the author in this footnote was the first-year Contracts
professor of the author of this Article.
3. See Emily Sherwin, Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 79
T x. L. REV. 2083, 2091 (2001) (explaining that equity principles "adjus[t] the outcomes of general
rules when their application to particular cases produces results that are too harsh or are contrary to the
underlying objectives of the rules").
4. For example, restitution is an equitable remedy to avoid a result of unjust enrichment when
returning plaintiff to pre-contract status quo or to provide compensation for a benefit conferred under an
unenforceable contract. See RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF REsTITUnoN AND UNJUST ENRICHAENT §§ 37, 38
(Tentative Draft No. 3, 2004); 66 Am Jur. 2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 13 ("It is not enough
that a benefit was conferred on the defendant, and rather, the enrichment to the defendant must be
unjust in that the defendant received a true windfall or 'something for nothing."'); see also Sherwin,
supra note 3, at 2085-88 (chronicling the historical origins of unjust enrichment as an equitable
principle and a quasi-contract remedy).
5. The example most often given to describe the unwillingness of the law to award damages that
would constitute a windfall is a situation in which one party has breached a contract but ordinary
contract damages will result in compensating the plaintiff more than the plaintiff was harmed. See
BRIAN A. BLUM, CoNTRAcTs: ExAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 628 (3d ed. 2004) (describing the principle of
unfair forfeiture to apply when "the normal measure of damages, while technically correct, has the
effect of giving the plaintiff a windfall because it is unduly expensive to achieve the plaintiff's
contractual expectations, and that expense is disproportionate to any actual advantage that the plaintiff
has lost as a result of the breach"). The two cases most often cited for this proposition that such a
windfall award would constitute "waste" are Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109
(Okla. 1963) (holding that contract damages for failure to restore land used for strip mining to past
condition would constitute economic waste where diminution in value was much smaller amount) and
Jacobs & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239 (N.Y. 1921) (holding that contract damages for breach
involving substituting a nearly identical brand of plumbing pipe during home construction would
constitute economic waste where diminution in value was much smaller amount). See also Judith L.
Maute, Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co. Revisited: The Ballad of Willie and Lucille, 89
NW. U. L. REV. 1341 (1995) (detailing the obscured facts of the Peevyhouses' negotiations with
Garland Coal).
6. See BLuM, supra note 5, at 883-84 (describing the Restatement (Second) of Contracts' preserva-
tion of the rule of economic waste, though not the terminology, as stemming from the drafters' concerns
that owners of substantially completed contracts would receive windfalls).
7. See Juanda Lowder Daniel & Kevin Scott Marshall, Avoiding Economic Waste in Contract
Damages: Myths, Misunderstanding and Malcontent, 85 NEB. L. REV. 875, 878 (2007) (arguing that not
awarding expectation damages in any contract for fear of a "windfall" is economically inefficient
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But the labeling of gains as windfalls is no longer left to judges mulling over
contract breaches and divorce settlements. Currently, decrying others' profits as
windfalls is popular among journalists, policy makers, law makers, industry
participants, and the public at large. Once an economic gain is spotted that
seems suspiciously large or too easily earned, then, like the "pod people" in
Invasion of the Body Snatchers,8 the observer must point and alert the public
that this "windfall" gain deviates from an acceptable baseline.9 If laws are not in
place to prevent this gain, then regulators should step in and correct this
loophole by promulgating new laws tailored to the situation that produced the
unlawful windfall.'0 The resulting law may prohibit the transaction altogether,
constrain the terms of any future transaction, or tax the windfall gain" so as to
deprive the windfall recipient of all or part of the benefit and redistribute the
benefit to the larger public.1
2
Though windfalls have always been disfavored in contract law, the law
defines windfall very narrowly.' 3 When courts classify economic gains as
windfalls and fashion rulings accordingly, these gains are generally amounts
received for no corresponding work or harm incurred, double payments for the
same corresponding obligation or harm, or relief from making a payment that is
because the breaching party's avoided requirement to compensate is in fact a windfall); see also Gideon
Parchomovsky, Peter Siegelman & Steve Thiel, Of Equal Wrongs and Half Rights, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv.
738, 742 (2007) (arguing that allowing courts to be able to split entitlements could cure this problem).
8. Compare INVAsION OF THE BODY SNATCHERS (Walter Wanger Productions 1956) (depicting pod
people as merely pointing silently at humans that had not been replaced) with INVASION OF THE BODY
SNATCHERS (Solofilm 1978) (depicting pod people as pointing and emitting shrill, piercing screams to
identify humans that had not been replaced).
9. Cf. Sherwin, supra note 3, at 2109-10 (arguing that the concept of unjust enrichment can be an
organizational principle upon which courts can rely in resorting to analogical reasoning).
10. For example, proposed legislation has been introduced in every legislative session since 2000 to
redistribute to U.S. consumers what is seen as undeserved "windfall profit" by oil companies,
paralleling the rise in gas prices this decade. See, e.g., Consumer Reasonable Energy Price Protection
Act of 2009, H.R. 1482, 111 th Cong. § 2(a) (2009) (proposing to impose a tax "equal to the applicable
percentage of the windfall profit on such sale"). The term "windfall profit" is then defined as meaning
"so much of the profit on such sale as exceeds a reasonable profit" to be determined by a "Reasonable
Profits Board." Id. at §2(b)(2).
11. See Joseph Tomain, Simple Rules for a Complex World, 36 JURaM'rRIcs J. 409 (1996) (reviewing
RICHARD A. EPs'rEIN, SDMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995)) (proffering his own "simple rules for
a regulatory world," including "[p]rudent competitors in a market should be allowed to earn reasonable
rates of return on their investments, but if through no effort of their own their goods become
extraordinarily valuable, the additional profits should be redistributed to consumers or taxpayers.").
12. Another creative way to redistribute one category of so-called windfalls, punitive damages, is to
mandate by statute that a percentage of such award be refunded to the state. See GA. CODE ANN.
§ 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (2000) (requiring seventy-five percent of any punitive damages award, less certain
litigation costs incurred, be paid into the state treasury); Ford v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 476 S.E.2d
565, 570 (Ga. 1996) (upholding as constitutional O.C.G.A. 51-12-5,1(e)(2) and stating that the "statute
furthers [the purpose of punishment] by not allowing the first plaintiff to reach the courthouse with a
product liability lawsuit to reap a windfall from the punitive damages, but instead requiring that
three-quarters of the punitive damages awarded be paid into the state treasury").
13. See Parchomovsky, et al., supra note 7, at 744-45 (arguing that courts generally let windfalls lie
if that represents the status quo).
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legally owed. 1 4 Courts generally do not classify as a windfall a legally received
payment merely because of its excessive nature, if the premise for the payment
is just. Therefore, the law applies a fairly mechanical classification rule and
does not label economic gains as windfalls merely out of distaste for the
underlying activity, sympathy to the payor or the unpopularity of the-recipient.
However, use of the term "windfall" has expanded beyond the maxims of
equity to mainstream discourse. Social commentators use the term in hopes of
creating the same result .in society that the term triggers in courts of law. When
critics see an economic gain to a particular individual or group that seems
unfair, excessive or disproportionate, then critics classify that gain as a windfall
in hopes of regulatory response. 15 The payment may be classified as such
because either the recipient seems undeserving of the gain or the payor seems
undeserving of the loss. Moreover, while the popular use of the word "windfall"
may bring to mind examples of the wind literally blowing objects of treasure to
unsuspecting persons, such as inheritances, lottery winnings or literal found
treasures, the term is increasingly used in the media and elsewhere to label
profits from legitimate and useful businesses and investments. From oil and gas
industry profits to executive salaries to real estate returns, marketplace gains are
labeled as windfalls to reflect a moral judgment on the transaction and particu-
larly the recipient.
Though the law is not necessarily diminished because popular discourse has
borrowed and distorted a word with a particular meaning and force into
something quite different, legal scholars should take note of the evolving use of
this term. The repeated attachment of the term "windfall" to non-windfalls may
simply lessen the impact of the word over time, in which case the effect on the
operation of law. would be quite minimal. However, the overuse of the term
"windfall" reflects a misunderstanding not only of what a windfall is, but also a
misunderstanding of the power and the appropriateness of law to rewrite
economic contracts, either in hindsight or on a continuing basis. Although
courts will resort to principles of equity to avoid true windfalls, critics seem to
suggest that regulators should use their own biased senses of morality and
fairness to prohibit and adjust bargained-for payments made by negotiating
parties with full information. Once critics label a payment as a windfall,
14. See discussion infra Section IV.
15. Among the approximately seven bills introduced into the 111th Congress at the time of this
writing that include the word "windfall" in the title or the "findings" section, is one that claims that the
Bowl Championship Series bestows an undeserved windfall on teams because of the luck of their
conference affiliation. See College Football Playoff Act of 2009, H.R. 390, 111th Cong. (2009)
("Congress finds that... the colleges and universities whose teams participate in the post-season
football bowls experience significant financial windfall including increased applications for enrollment,
recruiting advantages, increased alumni donations, and increased corporate sponsorship that provides a
competitive advantage over universities whose teams are ineligible or statistically at a disadvantage
from the BCS bowl competitions because of their conference affiliation.").
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whether it is payment for a tank of gas in the middle of a hurricane 16 or
payment of a salary for a new chief executive officer, 17 then regulators who
heed that criticism must call for a legal result of either prohibiting the pay-
ment, l8 taxing the payment or otherwise restricting the ability of parties to
bargain.' 9 However, these types of payments are not the double recoveries or
overcompensating payments that the law seeks to avoid. These economic gains
are merely unpopular for various reasons.
This Article does not mean to suggest that there is anything magical about the
term "windfall." Although the term "windfall" does seem to have rhetorical
power, without use of this term, the same discussions of fairness and excessive
profits would still take place, only with a different word in its place. Therefore
this Article merely uses the term "windfall" as a way to analyze a popular
notion that some marketplace gains are undeserved and subject to redistribution.
This Article will first attempt in Section II to create a taxonomy of economic
gains expanding on the historical use of the word "windfall." Then, this article
will examine the differences between the use of the term "windfall" in courts of
law, the popular media, and in political discourse in Sections III, IV and V. With
this information, this article will seek to determine the roots of the moral
judgments being made by speakers in the media regarding so-called windfalls
and explore the dangers of classifying otherwise beneficial economic gains as
windfalls using current examples of public outcry over profitable gains. This
article then argues that at- a deeper level, problems exist whenever social
commentators describe legitimate returns on human capital, social capital or
economic capital as undeserving, regardless of what term is used. To that end,
this article explores the use of the term "windfall" as a rhetorical device as a
16. See Elizabeth Souder, Drivers Fill Up On Conspiracy Theories: Why is Gas So Expensive?,
DALLAS MoRmNG NEWS, May 29, 2006, available at http://www.dallasnews.comlsharedcontent/dws/bus/
stories/052806dnbizgasconspiracy.908bf56.html (reporting that "the amount of complaining in Washing-
ton during the last nine months over gas gouging and windfall profits should prompt any conspiracy
theorist to question whether there's a connection.").
17. See Jeffrey Tebbs & Ady Barkan, State Should Tax Wall Street Windfall Bonuses, HARTFORD
CouRAw, Feb. 10, 2009, at A17 (arguing that the state of "Connecticut levy a windfall tax of 50 percent
on the cash bonuses received by any executive working for a firm rescued by the federal bailout" if the
firm posted a net loss for the second half of 2008 and the employee's total compensation were over
$150,000).
18. See Consumer-First Energy Act of 2008, S. 2991, § 203(a) 110th Cong. (2008) (making it
"unlawful for any supplier to sell, or offer to sell crude oil, gasoline, petroleum distillates, or biofuel
subject to [an energy emergency declaration] in, or for use in, the area to which that declaration applies
at an unconscionably excessive price.").
19. See Gretchen Morgenson, Gimme Back Your Paycheck, N.Y. TiEs, Feb. 22, 2009, at B1
(reporting that although executives at seven collapsed financial institutions received salary and bonus
"windfalls," "[c]urrently, there is no legal mechanism for forcing the regurgitation of past pay, so such
efforts would need to be bolstered by new legislation."); H.R. Rep. 111-064, at 4 (2009) (citing a need
for legislation to amend the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 because of the public
"outrage at the idea that institutions that were depending on public funds for their continued existence
during a severe economic downturn would provide very large bonuses and retention payments to their
executives and employees while the public funds were still outstanding.").
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way to begin a conversation about the much harder to measure phenomenon of
attempts to regulate away unpopular types of economic gains. This article
concludes with the proposition that any attempt to classify Excess Earned
Windfalls in an attempt to redistribute them under any theory is flawed, subject
to abuse, and so should be avoided.
I. WHAT IS A WINDFALL?
A. Definitional Work
Black's Law. Dictionary defines "windfall" as "an unanticipated benefit, usu.
in the form of a profit and not caused by the recipient. ' 20 "Profit" is defined as
"the excess of revenues over expenditures in a business transaction; GAIN.,
21
This definition is broader than that employed by courts. As will be discussed
later, courts tend to label as windfalls only those gains that are so unjust they
must be avoided or disgorged. Obviously, courts do not seek to void or avoid
every unanticipated benefit or profit. This Article will first explicate this ordi-
nary dictionary definition of whether something unexpected came to the recipi-
ent without her causing it to do so.
1. "Caused by the Recipient"
This portion of the definition implicates an important judgment. that seems to
underlie popular uses of the term: whether the gain is deserved. Some legal
scholars have attempted to craft more workable legal definitions by specifically
focusing on whether the economic gain was the result of "productive activities
that society wishes to reward."22 The common use of the term "windfall" tends
to reflect a judgment by the speaker as to whether the gain was deserved, i.e.,
was it the result of useful and meaningful effort. As this Article will show, this
subjective judgment can be problematic when used as the basis for legal
consequences.
The taxonomy below and the analysis that follows will first attempt to
explore the meaning of the phrase "not caused by the recipient." Causation may
mean any type of involvement in a chain of events. For example, a pedestrian
who trips over a brick, only to turn over the brick to find a buried piece of
jewelry, caused the object to be found. The pedestrian did not do anything'to
cause the previous owner to put the object there or to convey the object to the
pedestrian, however, and did not intentionally identify the brick that she turned
over. A slot machine player who puts a nickel into a slot machine, pulls the lever
and receives hundreds of nickels back caused the nickels to be released by
putting in the initial nickel and pulling the handle, although the player did not
20. BLACK'S LAW DICrMONARY 1631 (8th ed. 2004).
21. Id. at 1246-47.
22. See Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1491 (1999) (defining windfalls as "economic
gains independent of work, planning, or other productive activities that society wishes to reward").
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specifically cause three cherries to stop spinning and settle into a straight line.
Without the players' actions, the machine would not have worked in such a way
as to give the player the nickels. The player did not cause the machine to work
through skill or additional effort; the machine is calibrated so as to pay out to
players randomly. However, one could say that the owner of the machine
created a system in which users would play and, at times, cause the nickels to be
released. Depending on the observer's inclination about the utility of walking
and the utility of gambling, an observer might designate either one as a
windfall. This Article will argue that neither incident involves a windfall.
Used in this way, the word "cause" by itself does not seem to be the same as
"deserve," although one's perception of whether the recipient caused the gain to
come about may be intertwined with the perception of whether the recipient
deserved the gain. For example, if the jewelry finder was involved in an
expedition to find buried jewelry, and had expended great amounts of time and
effort to find the jewelry, then one might perceive the jewelry find as being
caused by the finder. The effort the finder expends tends to sway the perception
of both "cause" and "deserve." Therefore, one way to define a windfall is to
carve out gains that the recipient deserved in some way, leaving only unde-
served gains as windfalls. The two original examples above of the inadvertent
finder and the slot machine player then could both be classified as windfalls
because the recipients did not put forth corresponding effort or give anything of
corresponding value in return for the gain.
However, in common discourse, the word "deserve" is also used in circum-
stances in which a recipient may not have worked or given consideration for a
benefit but is nonetheless worthy. A homeless person may deserve an opportu-
nity or government benefit, for example, because of need or because that person
seems to have had poor luck in the past when the person did expend effort or
consideration. For example, one may feel differently about the slot machine
winner if the winner is in dire financial straits or if the winner had put in many
nickels and pulled the level many times the day before. Therefore, public
perception of whether an actor deserves a gain may also take into account that
person's relative current wealth or position and history of unrelated transactions
in which an undeserved loss, a "negative windfall" occurred.
Therefore, determining whether a gain is "deserved" is much more subjective
than whether the recipient's actions are a "but for" cause of the gain. For
example, a contract party, who negotiates and signs a contract, causes whatever
contract amounts to be paid to each contract party by virtue of the bargain. In
these marketplace transactions, parties bargain at arm's length with a profit
motivation, expecting to cause amounts to be paid from one party to another.
However, circumstances may arise so that amounts paid under a contract may
be labeled as undeserved by a particular party, even if caused by that party.
Usually, these purportedly undeserved amounts seem so because they are
unanticipated.
[Vol. 8:339
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2. "Unanticipated"
The dictionary definition seems to indicate that a windfall is necessarily
unanticipated, or unexpected.23 Again, this definition appears to exclude market-
place transactions where parties are bargaining intentionally. As will be dis-
cussed below, a conceptual problem arises when attempting to classify a gain if
the gain itself was expected, but the amount or timing of the gain is unexpected.
For example, if a person enters into a $1,000,000 life insurance contract on
Monday, with the primary beneficiary being her spouse, and then the insured is
in a fatal car crash on Wednesday after making only one $100 monthly
payment, then the payment to the spouse is arguably a windfall under the
dictionary definition. An eventual payout of life insurance proceeds was ex-
pected, but an immediate payout, though covered by the terms of the contract,
was not. Similarly, a shop owner enters into a one-year contract with a shoe
designer to buy 20 pairs of. shoes a month at $30 per pair, thinking she will
resell them at $45 per pair. However, the shoes become very popular and the
owner is able to raise the price to $60 per pair, doubling her profit. The shop
owner entered into the contract based on an expectation of a certain amount of
profit, but the amount was greater than expected.
In both of the cases, an observer might claim that the amounts received are
windfalls, or at least the portion over the expected amount. In the case of the
shoe store owner, the extra $15 per pair might be considered a windfall. In the
case of the insurance beneficiary, any amount over the expected present value of
the policy, calculated using the probability that a payout would occur in the first
month of the policy, would be a windfall. This Article will argue that neither of
these amounts are windfalls. Although something external to the contract
happened that caused the contract to be either more profitable or profitable
sooner than expected, the parties contracted in the shadow of these possibilities.24 The
parties who profited put their capital at risk, and the bargains could have had opposite
results. The insured could have lived for thirty years, paying $36,000 in premiums
over that time, and the shoe store owner could have seen a slump in shoe sales. If the
former profits were windfalls, then these hypothetical losses are negative windfalls, or
23. See Parchomovsky, et al., supra note 7, at 755 (arguing that because most windfalls are
foreseeable, that a more accurate test for unexpected should be whether "an event['s] expected value is
substantially smaller than the costs of any action to prevent or contract for it."). This cost-benefit
analysis, though not burdened by the qualitative judgment of "dessert," could be problematic as applied
to contracts because in hindsight, any occurrence will seem so improbable as to have been contracted
for simply because it was not.
24. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRACrS § 154 (stating that "a party bears the risk of mistake
when (a) the risk is allocated to him by agreement of the parties, or (b) he is aware, at the time the
contract is made, that he has only limited knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake
relates but treats his limited knowledge as sufficient, or (c) the risk is allocated to him by the court on
the ground that it is reasonable in the circumstances to do so.").
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windfalls to the opposite contracting party.25 To avoid a situation in which every
contract gives rise to a windfall and a negative windfall, this Article will argue that
neither of these contracts will give rise to a windfall, regardless of whether circum-
stances unfold in a very probable way or in a less probable way because the gains are
caused by the recipient and not wholly unanticipated.26
3. The Role of Chance
The definition's use of both the word "unanticipated" and the phrase "not
caused" also reflects the sense that windfalls are in some way the result of
chance.2 7 Surprisingly, the concept of chance plays an important role in our
system of laws. For example, some anti-gambling laws distinguish games of
luck with games of skill,28 preferring to prohibit only games of luck.29 There-
fore, under this dichotomy, a community could have a golf tournament with a
monetary prize, but not a lottery. Though separating out chance profits may
serve a purpose in these distinctions, chance is to some degree a part of
everyday life and of every economic endeavor.3° If a new business survives,
25. See Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration and the Windfall Principle of Contract Remedies, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 4 (1991) (recognizing "that some disparity between anticipation and realization is an
inevitable incident of every contractual exchange.").
26. Note that though contract doctrine would void a contract that rested on a mistaken factual
premise, a "mistake" of "fact" does not include an error in judgment or an incorrect prediction of future
events. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 151 ("A party's prediction or judgment as to events
to occur in the future, even if erroneous, is not a "mistake" as that word is defined here.").
27. See Kades, supra note 22, at 1491 (emphasizing that the definition of the term "windfall"
"distinguishes gains due to luck from those due to effort or enterprise.").
28. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §18-10-102(2) (2004) (defining "gambling" as "risking any money,
credit, deposit, or other thing of value for gain contingent in whole or in part upon lot, chance, the
operations of a gambling device, or the happening or outcome of an event, including a sporting event,
over which the person taking a risk has no control."); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.0237 (2003) (defining
"gambling" as "staking or risking something of value upon the outcome of a contest of chance or a
future contingent event not under the person's control or influence.").
29. A recent lawsuit in Kentucky tests whether "Texas Hold 'Em" poker is a game of chance under
the Kentucky anti-gambling law. See Interactive Media Entertainment and Gaming Ass'n v. Wingate,
Nos. 2008-CA-002000-OA, 2008-CA, 2008-CA-002019-OA, 2008-CA-002036-OA, 2009 WL 142995
(Jan. 20, 2009) (reversing the trial court's seizure of domain names of internet gambling websites as
"gambling devices," but focusing its analysis primarily on whether an internet address is a "device");
Opinion & Order, Commonwealth of Kentucky v. 141 Internet Domain Names, No. 08-CI-1409 (Oct.
16, 2009) (holding, inter alia, that poker is an unlawful game of chance because "[cihance, though not
the only element of a game of poker, is the element that defines its existence"); see also Ky. REV. STAT.
528.010(3)(a) (2008) (defining "gambling" as "staking or risking something of value upon the outcome
of a contest, game, gaming scheme, or gaming device which is based upon an element of chance .... A
contest or game in which eligibility to participate is determined by chance and the ultimate winner is
determined by skill shall not be considered to be gambling."). But see Brief of Poker Players' Alliance
at 5, Commonwealth of Kentucky v. 141 Internet Domain Names, No. 08-CI-1409 (Franklin Cir. Ct.,
Div. H Sept. 26, 2008) ("While the initial distribution of cards and replacement cards [in poker] are
random, the decision on which cards to discard, the methods and steps in wagering, whether to wager
or fold, the analysis of playing habits of other players, and the management of a player's chips from
hand to hand are all player-based decisions greatly influenced by the skill levels of the player.").
30. See Christine Hurt, Regulating Public Morals and Private Markets: Online Securities Trading,
Internet Gambling and the Speculation Paradox, 86 B.U. L. REv. 371, 378 (2006) (creating a taxonomy
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then there was some element of chance in that success story. If real estate
purchased many years ago becomes highly valuable because of the business that
builds next to it, then chance is also at work. If new law school graduates begin
their careers just as an economic boom is beginning, their good fortune will
make their job search easier. Separating out hard work from luck is only easy at
the ends of the spectrum. For most economic gains, chance and competence are
intertwined. 31 Attempting to separate windfall gains that are the result of chance
and earned gains that are the result of hard work is an illusory pursuit.
B. Taxonomy of Windfalls
Satisfied with the definition of true windfall as wholly unanticipated and not
caused by the recipient, this'Article will attempt to rigorously classify various
types of economic gains in order to shed light on commonplace uses of the term
"windfall. 32 Therefore, this Article will use the following terms to distinguish
among several types of gains that are frequently termed "windfalls": Illegal
Windfalls, Wrongful Windfalls, Classic Windfalls, Gratuitous Windfalls, Regula-
tory Windfalls and Earned Windfalls.33
As a foundational matter, this Article will only classify economic gains that
are true increases to wealth. Payments made to persons as either repayment of
principal of a debt legally owed or compensation for a wrong done do not increase
the net worth of those persons and so are not economic gains. However, monetary
payments that may reflect compensation for merely the time value of money or
opportunity costs of labor will be treated as gains in their entirety.
Illegal Wrongful Classic Gratuitous Regulatory Earned
Windfalls Windfalls Windfalls Windfalls Windfalls Windfalls
Non-Marketplace Marketplace
Increasing Social Utility -- - -- - -- - - - -- - -- * -*
This spectrum is organized by placing windfalls with the least positive utility
on the left and the most utility on the right. Therefore, Illegal Windfalls, which
of speculative activities along a spectrum from "pure chance" to "skill mixed with chance," noting that
"even in contests of skill, the impact of chance can never be eliminated.").
31. See GREGORY H. HEMINGWAY, PAPA: A PERSONAL MEMOIR (1976) (quoting his father, Ernest
Hemingway, as saying "You make your own luck, Gig"); DARK KNIGHT (Warner Bros. 2008) (depicting
prosecutor Harvey Dent as saying "I make my own luck"); TITANIc (Twentieth Century Fox 1997)
(depicting the protagonist's evil fiancd as saying some variant of "I make my own luck" twice.).
32. This article will not explore the very interesting related question of non-economic windfalls,
such as the good fortune of being born intelligent, healthy or to wealthy parents.
33. As will be made clear, this Article takes the position that Earned Windfalls, and the subset
Excess Earned Windfalls, are not windfalls at all, but for the sake of argument and consistency, this
terminology will be retained.
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will generally involve a person taking property or services that do not belong to
that person in violation of criminal law, have the least positive utility, and in
fact have negative utility. Not prohibiting these types of gains will create
insecurity in the public and increase violence through vigilantism and private
retribution.34 If these types of thefts are rampant, economic actors may not put
forth efforts to achieve legitimate gains because they cannot know with cer-
tainty they will be able to keep those gains.
To the right are Earned Windfalls, which are the result of economic actors
producing goods and services that others are willing to purchase or putting
capital at risk that may be put to useful service. This category will be the largest
category, as explained below, and will encompass a wide range of economic
activity, some of which might be incorrectly labeled as Classic Windfalls by
some observers. Admittedly, some types of marketplace transactions for the
provisions of goods and services may seem more useful than others and capital
can be used for pursuits of differing utility. However, for simplicity all earned
increases will be treated similarly here. Earned Windfalls are the only category
consisting wholly of marketplace gains. Interestingly, though the law tends to
preserve gains that are the result of marketplace bargains,35 these are the types
of gains most often labeled as "windfalls" in public speech.36
1. Unlawful Increases to Wealth
(i) Illegal Windfalls
A discussion of illegal increases to wealth may seem unnecessary here, but
with the increasing criminalization of civil wrongs, distinguishing between
Illegal Windfalls, which are willful increases to wealth that violates either
criminal or civil laws, 37 from Wrongful Windfalls and even Earned Windfalls is*
necessary. The receipt of an Illegal Windfall is one that would expose the
recipient to penalties under criminal or civil laws. However, child support
awarded by a trial court in excess of state guidelines without a justifiable
departure that is reversed on appeal is merely a Wrongful Windfall, not an
Illegal Windfall. Salaries paid by a corporation to executives according to
34. See George P. Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89 HARV. L. REv.'469, 472-73 (1976)
(describing the transfer of the crime of larceny from one that protected society from disturbances of the
peace to one that protected individual interests in property.).
35. See Kull, supra note 25, at 7 (ascribing courts' tendencies to let contract windfalls lie where they
land as stemming from "the individualistic conception of contractual obligation as something exclu-
sively defined by the voluntary undertakings of the parties.").
36. See discussion infra, Section III.
37. Although this Article treats criminal profits as Illegal Windfalls, most proceeds of a crime do not
fit into the dictionary definition of being unexpected and not caused by the recipient. Criminals
generlly act in expectation of profit and generally expend effort toward that payday. Of course, these
illegal profits are not earned lawfully in any sense, so this Article will not characterize them as Earned
Windfalls. This categorization would.be in keeping with Professor Kades' definition, however problem-
atic, that windfalls are not the source of "productive activities that society wishes to reward." See
Kades, supra note 22, at 1491.
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contracts are Earned Windfalls, not Illegal Windfalls, even if the corporation
reports losses during that time, making the executives' efforts for those salaries
seem less than satisfactory. If a particular executive was found in breach of her
contract, then any salary paid after the breach would be a Wrongful Windfall,
but still not an Illegal Windfall.38 However, if the executives of a company knew that
lawyers were preparing for the company to file bankruptcy and so paid out large
bonuses on the eve of the filing, those payments would be Illegal Windfalls.
(ii) Wrongful Windfalls
A different category of economic gains that this Article discusses is in fact the
only group that the law traditionally labels as "windfall," and that is the
"Wrongful Windfall." These types of gains are not earned by either the provi-
sion of capital or services, or warranted to compensate for loss or harm. For a
court to award this type of payment, the court would have to ignore the
constraints of both law and equity. This type of windfall would give a party
compensation when that party has no loss or would attempt to compensate once
more a party that has already been made whole. In addition, this type of
payment might take the form of relieving an owing party of a legal debt without
further obligation. This Article will also treat as a Wrongful Windfall those
types of contract payments that a court would void under contract doctrines
such as fraudulent misrepresentation, mistake or unconscionability.
39
2. Lawful Increases to Wealth
(i) Classic Windfalls
The prime example of a windfall is a benefit that is not earned, but that is not
prohibited by law, such as treasure falling from the sky or being blown by the
vagaries of the wind.4" These true windfalls are only those rare windfalls that
arise unrelated to. any work, consumer purchase, investment, wager, service or
forbearance of the recipient. This category of unearned windfalls will then be
38. The practice of backdating of stock options is an example of a practice that would trigger
problems with categorization of any gains realized by the exercise of such options. In fact, the practice
of backdating may not have been illegal or prohibited by any rule or regulation. However, prosecutors
have argued that the failure to disclose the backdating violated securities laws. If so, then the question
arises whether the profits received by the employee due to the backdating practices of a corporation,
and the subsequent nondisclosure of those practices, would render the gain a wrongful windfall or an
earned windfall.
39. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNrRAcrs § 153 (1981) (describing when a contract is
voidable because of the mistake of one party at the time of a contract.); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
ComNTAcTs § 164 (1981) (describing when a contract is voidable because assent is induced by a
fraudulent or a material misrepresentation.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 174, 175 (1981)
(describing when a contract is voidable because of duress.); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 208
(1981) (describing when a court may refuse to enforce a contract or a contract term because of
unconscionability.).
40. See Kades, supra note 22, at 1491 (detailing the history of the term "windfall" that was used to
distinguish produce that had fallen off trees and bushes from produce that would have to be picked by
the gatherer.).
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divided into two categories. The first is the quintessential windfall, or Classic
Windfall. Classic Windfalls are not only unexpected by the recipient but also
unintended by any identifiable grantor. An example of a classic windfall would
be stumbling upon a $100 bill on the beach, with no identifiable owner who
may have dropped it.
Classic Windfalls under this taxonomy are extraordinarily rare.4' This paper
does not treat the search for buried treasure as a windfall, for example. Treasure
hunting in the modem era is done at great expense and investment, 42 and any
return would be deemed an Earned Windfall, as described below. Finding
treasure (or minerals, or oil, or a hidden jewelry box) on one's own land or in
property that one has purchased will also be treated as an Earned Windfall due
to the fact that the finder made an investment, whether in land, buildings or
personal property. The fact that the purchase is more valuable than earlier
thought does not nullify the initial act of purchasing the property with either
money, other property or services. 4 However, in those cases where the law of
contract would nullify the purchase of the land or property on the grounds of
mutual mistake or unilateral mistake, the accidental benefit would be a Wrong-
ful Windfall and would be disgorged. 44
(ii) Gratuitous Windfalls
A related type of unearned windfall that is more prevalent and familiar arises
when the payor intends a benefit upon the recipient, although the recipient did
not provide any type of consideration with the expectation of a return, such as in
the case of a gift or inheritance. These types of gains will be referred to here as
Gratuitous Windfalls. For purposes of analyzing these types of gains, we will
not address questions of gifts or inheritances that are clearly given in consider-
41. Again, for the sake of simplicity, this Article will only discuss economic gains. Otherwise, such
noneconomic benefits such as being born intelligent, healthy or to wealthy parents might be considered
a classic windfall.
42. See Thomas Catan, Judge Sides With Spain in Sunken-Treasure Fight, WALL ST. J., June 8, 2009,
at A14 (detailing litigation between a publicly-held marine. archaeology firm Odyssey Marine Explora-
tion Inc. and the Spanish government over recovered treasure and how an adverse ruling by the
magistrate resulted in a dip in Odyssey's stock price.).
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154 (1981) ("[Ilt is commonly understood that the
seller of farm land generally cannot avoid the contract of sale upon later discovery by both parties that
the land contains valuable mineral deposits, even. though the price was negotiated on the basic
assumption that the land was suitable only for farming and the effect on the agreed exchange of
performances is material."); see also Wood v. Boynton, 25 NW. 42 (Wis. 1885) (upholding prior sale of
gem for the price of a topaz, though later discovered to be a yellow diamond.).
44. Cases in which courts will apply the doctrine of mistake usually involve a buyer getting
something less than bargained for, not the seller transferring more than the seller had; courts place the
burden of knowledge on the seller of goods and property in these instances. Therefore, most mistake
cases involve negative windfalls, such as when two parties contract for the sale of a painting both
believe to be authentic, but is in fact, fake. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 (1981) ("A
contracts to sell and B to buy a tract of land, the value of which has depended mainly on the timber on
it. Both A and B believe that the timber is still there, but in fact it has been destroyed by fire. The
contract is voidable by B.").
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ation of future4 5 or past46 services, or other benefits that were bestowed or will
be bestowed on the payor under the condition that the benefit would be given in
return. If the gift or inheritance were clearly bargained for, regardless of
whether the bargain would be legally enforceable, then that economic gain
would fall into the next category of Earned Windfalls.
Though most gifts and inheritances could be described as windfalls, few
gratuitous transfers are truly unexpected or unrelated to the actions of the
recipient. Family members generally give one another gifts and inheritances
because of the existence of family ties and because each made some effort to
maintain pleasant relations. For a gift or bequest from a family member to be a
true unexpected and undeserved windfall, it would have to come from a
long-lost relative unknown to the recipient whose absence had not caused a
harm to be compensated. Gifts and inheritances from friends are even more
likely to be made because of kindnesses given, even if those kindnesses were
not made with any expectation of return. However, for purposes of our tax-
onomy, we will include unbargained for gifts and inheritances as Gratuitous
Windfalls.
(iii) Regulatory Windfalls
One category that may be worthy of a lengthier treatment elsewhere is the
Regulatory Windfall category. A Regulatory Windfall is an economic gain that
inures to a certain individual or entity rather than another in whole or in part
because of a particular regulatory action.4 7 For example, if a state legislature
passes a law that requires all swimming pools to be equipped with swimming
pool alarms, then current manufacturers of that safety device will experience
increased sales.48 The increased profits due to those sales may be deemed a
Regulatory Windfall. However, distinguishing between the profits that would
occur in a free market and the-profits that occur in the regulated market is very
difficult, particularly as time passes. In addition, the existence of such a state
law might induce others to enter the swimming pool alarm market, raising the
question of whether newcomers' profits would be Regulatory Windfalls or
Earned Windfalls. Because of the existence of a complex regulatory scheme,
with new laws being passed and old laws being repealed each year, the
identification of Regulatory Windfalls caused by either existing laws or changes
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 90 (1981) (describing the doctrine of promissory
estoppel, which enforces certain promises made to induce action by the promisee).
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 (1981) (describing under what conditions past
performance will make a promise binding and enforceable).
47. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, lll YALE L.J. 547, 555-57 (2001)
(creating four criteria to determine whether a Regulatory Windfall, or "giving," should be charged, just
as takings are compensated.).
48. In Professors Bell and Parchomovsky's wonderful article on "givings," they describe three types
of givings that might increase the value of real property, for example: the granting ofcertain rights,
such as mineral rights, the indirect benefit of a change in zoning limitations and the building of a park
nearby. See id. at 563-64.
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in the laws would be maddening.49
For example, one could argue that profits that are the result of a patent,
copyright or trademark are Regulatory Windfalls in the sense that the additional
profits are due to regulation that protects holders of intellectual property.50
However, one could also argue that an individual who puts both human and
economic capital at risk in creating a particular invention knowing that such
inventions will be granted patents may be seen as receiving an Earned Windfall
as a result of the patent and not a Regulatory Windfall. Then, if the life of the
patent is extended, that action might be seen as generating a Regulatory
Windfall. If, however, the patent protection is reduced, that action might be seen
as generating a Regulatory Windfall for competitors.
Regulatory Windfalls may be even more direct. For example, an individual,
business or nonprofit entity could receive government funds, either in the form
of a tax credit or a direct disbursement. Many of these gains may have substantial
positive utility and generate numerous benefits, while others may merely be the
result of regulatory capture, political preferences or waste unrelated to merit.51
Like other perceived windfalls, and running parallel to treatment of takings,
critics often challenge Regulatory Windfalls; the universe of possible responses
would include the assessment of a charge, tax,52 or prohibition if the benefit is
seen as unreasonably large and the recipients too small in number.53
(iv) Earned Windfalls
The term Earned Windfalls in this Article will be used broadly to define any
type of economic benefit that is the result of the beneficiary taking some action
that the beneficiary would not otherwise have taken. In addition, the payor is
not conferring this benefit accidentally or without expectation of anything in
return from the payee or beneficiary. In other words, salary for work, whether
the salary is the minimum wage or arguably disproportionately large compared
to the work provided, will be termed an Earned Windfall. As long as the
beneficiary incurred some cost, whether the cost of an economic investment or
the opportunity cost of time, then the return, whether probable or improbable,
will not be considered unearned, such as a Classic Windfall or a Gratuitous
49. See id. at 574 (conceding that nearly every power of government is related to. benefiting
someone, or bestowing a "giving" or Regulatory Windfall, as "[g]overnment largesse is widespread.").
50. See Lindsay Warren Brown, Givings and the Next Copyright Deferment, 77 FORDHAM L. REV.
809 (2008) (adopting the givings doctrine to suggest a charge for the Regulatory Windfall of extending
copyright terms under the Copyright Term Extension Act.).
51. Professors Bell and Parchomovsky distinguish Regulatory Windfalls along several axes, includ-
ing whether the benefit goes to a small number of persons (the concession of land to a professional
sports franchise) or to the public at large (the provision of public education.). See Bell &
Parchomovsky, supra note 47, at 555.
52. Professors Bell and Parchomovsky sidestep this query by proposing a charge on the "fair market
value" of the benefit for "chargeable givings." See id. at 605-06 (allowing that there might be a
problem between subjective value and fair market value, but otherwise assuming that fair market value
will be reasonably simple to assess.).
53. Id. at 616 (noting that in rare instances, glaring "givings" are barred by the state.).
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Windfall. Therefore, the category of Earned Windfalls will encompass many
types of economic gains, from lottery winnings to Nobel prize awards, stock
option grants to tender offers, real property sales proceeds to patent profits.
This category of Earned Windfalls may in fact include economic gains that
are commonly referred to as "windfalls" in popular discourse to reflect an
intuitive dislike of sharp business practices, speculation or just pure luck. This
Article will discuss individually different types of Earned Windfalls that are
unpopular and common subjects of regulatory discussion in Section VI. How-
ever, popular or unpopular, scorned or extolled, these types of gains flow
logically from contractual and property rights that are enforced by law.
C. Challenges to the Premise of the Earned Windfall
Although each of these categories has the term "windfall" in its label, this
Article argues that the Earned Windfall category does not contain any windfalls,
though gains in this category are frequently falsely categorized as Classic Windfalls,
Wrongful Windfalls or Illegal Windfalls. Unfortunately, popular contempt for
and mischaracterization of certain Earned Windfalls can become a self-fulfilling
prophecy as new regulation subsequently prohibits that type of gain, turning an
Earned Windfall into a prohibited Illegal Windfall or Wrongful Windfall.
One challenge to this taxonomy will be that to some, an Earned Windfall may
become so large as to become an unearned windfall, in whole or in part.
Although the recipient is deserving of some return on efforts or capital invest-
ment, some excess portion of the return, the Excess Earned Windfall, transforms
the gain from so-called honest gain into some sort of a windfall.
1. Excess Earned Windfalls as Wrongful Windfalls
One might suggest that a new category of Excess Earned Windfalls contain
only that amount of return that would be in excess of an Earned Windfall. While
definitionally this distinction has some appeal,54 this Article argues that no
compelling theory justifies the distinction and such a distinction would have
severe operational problems. In addition, the creation of a new category then
leads to the question of whether and how Excess Earned Windfalls should be
treated differently than Earned Windfalls. Excess Earned Windfalls could be
prohibited, as Illegal Windfalls and Wrongful Windfalls are, or disfavored under
tax laws, as some Gratuitous Windfalls 55 and Earned Windfalls are.
5 6
54. Moreover, proposed windfall profits taxes and war profits taxes attempt to engage in just this
type of line-drawing.
55. For example, much of the rhetoric supporting the estate and gift tax is that the recipient did not
earn or deserve the payment. See Grayson M.P. McCouch, The Empty Promise of Estate Tax Repeal, 28
VA. TAX REv. 369, 385 (2008) (scorning "abolitionists" for not acknowledging "large inherited fortunes
squandered by undeserving beneficiaries" but instead focusing on "virtuous, hard-working entrepre-
neurs.").
56. For example, some types of executive compensation income trigger negative consequences for
the payor, incentivizing the payor to reduce the payment.
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Illegal Wrongful Classic Gratuitous Excess Earned
Windfalls Windfalls Windfalls Windfalls Windfalls Windfalls
Non-Marketplace Marketplace
Increasing Social Utility - - - - - - > - -- -- > --> -> -- -4 ->
Perhaps one could make an argument that an Excess Earned Windfall is a
Wrongful Windfall, which should not be enforced as contrary to public policy,
as some contracts are. In fact, some Excess Earned Windfalls, such as the
purchased topaz stone that is revealed to be a diamond,57 bear a close resem-
blance to what courts have held to be Wrongful Windfalls, such as the pur-
chased infertile beef cow that is revealed to be not only fertile but pregnant.58
Some commentators have suggested curing each of these types of cases by
"splitting" the "windfall" between the parties.59 In some ways, redistributing
part of the gain through taxation is one way to categorically split the perceived
Excess Earned Windfall in all types of economic gains, though the taxpayer
recipients are not parties to the contract or transaction.
However, most Excess Earned Windfalls are not similar to either the valuable
topaz or the pregnant beef cow. Most Earned Windfalls that are labeled as
excessive do not arise from unforeseen and unforeseeable events. Receiving a
bucket full of nickels from a slot machine is foreseeable; the possibility of such
an occurrence is what causes gamblers to put the nickel in the slot. Dying while
an insurance policy is in place, even the day after it is in place, is also
foreseeable; policyholders would not purchase policies if dying was not pos-
sible, and they would procrastinate purchasing the policy indefinitely if dying
the next day was impossible. Furthermore, Earned Excess Windfalls are also
dissimilar to other types of Wrongful Windfalls that are disfavored in the law in
that they do not seek to grant a double recovery or compensate someone for a
loss that was not incurred. Wrongful Windfalls are not wrongful based on the
mere size of the payment to be made, and Wrongful Windfalls are not made
right if extremely small. To categorize a payment based not on its nature but on
its mere size is problematic.
Another difference is the intent of the parties. Payments that are described as
Wrongful Windfalls in the law are generally not payments resulting from an
agreement of the parties. In the case of contracts, courts will say that because of
57. See Wood v. Boynton, 25 N.W. 42, 44 (Wis. 1885) (holding that seller of $700 diamond could
not recover the diamond after selling it as a topaz for $1 because there was no mistake as to the thing
they were transferring and that Mrs. Wood could not escape her "bad bargain.").
58. See Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887) (holding that cow's owner did not have to
deliver the cow because the parties' mistake went to "the whole substance of the agreement" and not
just as to a difference in "quality.").
59. See Parchomovsky, et al., supra note 7, at 745-46 (arguing that splitting windfalls would have
"no appreciable ex ante incentive effects on future behavior" because of the unforeseen, and presum-
ably unforeseeable, nature of the event that caused the windfall.).
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mistake or frustration, the parties did not have an agreement at the time of
contracting. 60 Real estate "windfalls" occur because someone is willing to pay
the purchase price. Executive compensation "windfalls" occur because the
Board of Directors has agreed to pay a particular compensation package.
Entrepreneurs are able to sell their start-up companies to larger ones because the
acquirer is willing to pay the purchase price. In the case of the Wrongful
Windfall, one party is unwilling to consummate the transaction or wanting it to
be unwound and asking the court for relief.6' In many Excess Earned Windfalls,
not only are the parties willing to effectuate the transfer, but the transaction
itself would not occur if those payments were prohibited or possibly taxed to a
great extent. The real estate owner might not have sold, the new chief executive
officer might not have accepted the job, and the entrepreneur might not have put
her life savings into starting a company.
A third difference between Wrongful Windfalls and Excess Earned Windfalls
is the positive social utility associated with each type of gain. Arguably, Excess
Earned Windfalls do not create negative social utility.62 An argument can be
made that the lure of excess windfalls creates substantial positive utility. If
entrepreneurs and other business participants have unlimited downside risk, but
capped upside risk, then they may not have any incentive to innovate or invest
capital and may prefer less risky ventures. In various areas of the economy,
excess returns, or Excess Earned Windfalls, are seen as an incentive device to
encourage useful activities.
Realistically, the result of creating a different category of Excess Earned
Windfalls is to suggest that the law could treat those gains differently. For
example, social commentators may want to point to Excess Earned Windfalls to
require the law to prohibit them, as is the case with Illegal Windfalls, or to
protect others against paying them, as with Wrongful Windfalls. Operationally,
for the vast majority of Excess Earned Windfalls, such as salaries and asset
sales, this would be problematic in our capitalist economic system. Popularly
elected lawmakers then would determine what a reasonable return is for various
60. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRAS § 152 (1981) ("Relief is only appropriate in situations
where a mistake of both parties has such a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances as to
upset the very basis for the contract.").
61. See Kull, supra note 25, at 4 (recognizing that the complaining party will argue that the risk of
some basic assumption changing was not allocated in the contract and that the responding party will
always respond that the risk was allocated to the complaining party.).
62. Perhaps an argument can be made that Excess Earned Windfalls generate envy and social unrest.
John Edwards, candidate for United States president, often referred to "Two Americas" in both the 2004
campaign and the 2008 campaign. See John Edwards, Transformational Change for the World,
JohnEdwards08.com, available at http://johnedwards.comnews/speeches/nhip20070315/ (last visited
August 11, 2009) ("In the richest country in the history of the globe, we have more millionaires and
more billionaires that ever-but we also have more Americans living in poverty-7 million people
unable to fulfill their basic needs of food and shelter, no matter how many jobs they work-not less.").
But see Inequality in'America, THE ECONOMIST, June 17, 2006 (theorizing that at least until 2000, a
central part of the American Dream was that rising tides float all boats and that Edwards' "Two
Americas" tale fell flat.).
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investments or occupations and then restrict, tax or claw back excess returns.6 3
This system is problematic for various reasons. Not only would calculating a
reasonable rate of return be nearly impossible,64 but the danger of creating
disincentives for entrepreneurs, investors, innovators, inventors, managers and
other economic actors is quite real. Without the lure of a potential Excess
Earned Windfall much useful activity would not be undertaken.
Finally, the process of distinguishing between reasonable Earned Windfalls
and unreasonable Excess Earned Windfalls would be a process burdened by
moral judgments and not economic logic designed to provide incentives for
worthy pursuits. Excess Earned Windfalls would then exist in the eye of the
beholder, subject to biases and prejudices regarding types of work and invest-
ments. Arguably, markets do a much better job at valuing goods, services and
capital than elected officials.
2. Excess Earned Windfalls as Classic Windfalls
Another, equally troubling response would be to conceptualize the Excess
Earned Windfall as a Classic Windfall and subject to some sort of redistribution.
This characterization is more intellectually compelling; one might think of the
abnormal return to human effort as being caused by some amount of luck.
Classic Windfalls are largely characterized by the presence of luck; for ex-
ample, a finder of abandoned jewelry underneath the tripped-over brick cer-
tainly received that economic gain more out of luck than effort. So, one might
be tempted to think that abnormal returns from investing or creating a website
or purchasing a piece of real estate also result from luck.
Labeling the abnormal portion of an Earned Excess Windfall a Classic
Windfall invites several puzzling but important questions. As discussed above,
determining which portion of the return is the excess portion and second, the
action then required for the excess portion is not an easy undertaking. For
purposes of this Article, we will assume that the answer to the second question
is determinable, whether the result is taxation, prohibition or otherwise.
Notwithstanding the operational concerns, the threshold definitional question
is even more troubling. Under what criteria will the Earned Windfall be
scrutinized to determine if any portion is an Excess Earned Windfall? Unfortu-
nately, current debates provide many examples of both the difficulty of this
determination and also the willingness of legislatures and courts to engage
themselves in this determination. From executive compensation 65 to tort recover-
63. Currently, this scenario is being considered for certain types of executive compensation. See
discussion infra Section VI(C)(1).
64. See Kades, supra note 22, at 1541 (explaining that some politicians' efforts to the contrary,
determining what is an abnormal profit in any industry is impossible.).
65. See discussion infra Section VI(C)(I).
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ies 6 to prices during natural disasters, 67 decision makers are quite comfortable
with declaring what part of a marketplace return is "fair." Past events predict
that calculation problems will be no stumbling block should public outcry of
excess windfall resonate with lawmakers.
A third question that is even more important, and that might make the other
two moot, is why declare any portion of a marketplace windfall excess at all?
Other than appeasing public scorn, no economic reason seems to exist to let the
public stake a claim over the excess windfall. Assuming that the desired result
of declaring Excess Earned Windfalls as Classic Windfalls is to redistribute
through taxation, perhaps one argument is that in an era of scarce resources,
some assets must be taxed.68 But the need for revenues does not answer the
question of why one type of gain is better to be taxed than another. Other
commentators flip the "why" question into a "why not" question and suggest
that taxing away gains achieved through luck has no negative economic impact
69because it will not change incentives. If the merely fortunate are not making
plans based on unexpected luck anyway, then taxing away or prohibiting their
good luck will not skew their behavior in the same way taxing away earned
income might. This argument may be salient with purely Classic Windfalls.
However, with Earned Excess Windfalls, the promise of the luck-induced
abnormal return does incentivize marketplace participants to work toward
Earned Windfalls with the hope of the Earned Excess Windfall.
Having answered the "why not" question, the Article must return to exploring
the "why" question. Why does a community believe it desirable to declare any
economic return an Excess Earned Windfall and treat that excess portion as a
Classic Windfall? This Article will turn to this fundamental question in Section
VI. Although this analysis may be tardy as prohibition of certain returns and
taxation of others abound currently, a renewed look at this question is required.
II. WHAT Do WE CALL A WINDFALL?
Unfortunately, many do see a separate category of Excess Earned Windfall
that is ripe for piecemeal regulation without a consistent theory of regulation.
Attempts are then made to prohibit that excess windfall, and some of these
attempts are successful. The declaration of something as a "windfall" resonates
with lawmakers, and the then-tainted economic gain becomes the subject of
66. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.303(a) (2003) (limiting economic damages in medical
malpractice wrongful death cases to $500,000 without regard to the income of the deceased or the
number of dependents reliant on that income.).
67. See DANIEL A. FARBER & JIM CHEN, DISASTERS AND THE LAW: KATRINA AND BEYOND 144-45 (2006)
(explaining that states often affected by hurricanes have price gouging laws that cap emergency prices
at pre-emergency levels.).
68. One of the rationales for a war profits tax is that the government needs additional revenues
during times of war. Similarly, calls for crude oil windfall profits taxes are more salient when gas prices
are high for consumers.
69. See Kades, supra note 22, at 1494-95.
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regulatory discussion. The next section of this Article will attempt to address
this labeling of excess windfalls in a systematic way.
A. Media Research Dataset
To attempt to draw conclusions about what kinds of economic gains society
considers excess windfalls, this Section utilizes a dataset of articles from the
New York Times ("N.YT.") and Wall Street Journal .("W.S.J.") in which the
term "windfall" appears. These articles were published in the six-month period
beginning January 1, 2007 and ending July 1, 2007. These two U.S. newspapers
were chosen due to their broad, national readership and because they are
generally seen as reflecting differing ideological viewpoints. 70 Both newspapers
cover a wide range of current news stories; however, the New York Times is
also a local outlet, reporting on stories affecting New York and the tri-state area
as well as national news stories.
Somewhat surprisingly, the number of instances of the use of the term
"windfall" in the N.YT. was similar to the number of occurrences in the W.S.J.
During the relevant time period, the term "windfall" appeared 126 times in 110
documents in the W.S.J., 122 times in 113 documents in the N.YT. After
removing instances in which the term was merely used as part of a proper or
common name also yield similar results: 116 instances in 101 documents in the
W.S.J., 117 instances in 110 documents in the N.Y.T.
1. New York Times Dataset
The N.Y.T. is a daily newspaper; therefore, the N.Y.T. published 181 editions
during the relevant time period. The number of individual articles during that
same time frame could number in the tens of thousands. Therefore, the fact that
the word "windfall" was used 122 times in 113 documents during that period is
not significant. However, analysis of the contexts in which the term was used
could provide information on whether and why media outlets use the term to
describe the category discussed here as possible Excess Earned Windfalls.
From the dataset of 122 instances, 4 uses were excluded that used the term to
refer to a repealed or proposed "windfall tax" or "windfall profits tax." Because
the reporter or quoted speaker was merely using the phrase associated with that
tax, very little can be inferred from its usage.71 For the same reason, one use of
a proper noun with the word "windfall" in it was also omitted.72 Thus, the
70. See Daniel Okrent, Is the New York Times a Liberal Newspaper?, N.Y. TIMEs, July 25, 2004
(answering in the affirmative: "Yes, of course it is."); Tim Groseclose & Jeffrey Milyo, A Measure of
Media Bias, 120(4) Q.J. EcoN. 1191, 1212 (2005) (announcing the counterintuitive result that the WSJ
was the most liberal newspaper in its study of media bias, excluding its conservative opinion pages.).
71. See, e.g., Russell Gold and Bhushan Bahree, Oil Companies May See an Ebb in Profit Gusher,
WALL ST. J., April 10, 2007, at Al ("Marathon Oil Group faces a new requirement in Equatorial Guinea
that foreign producers be required to pay 'any windfall tax that may be imposed by the state."').
72. See Charles Duhigg, Bilking the Elderly, With a Corporate Assist, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2007, at
11 (describing various fraudulent schemes concerning the elderly, including a sham investment fund
called "Windfall Investments.").
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resulting dataset contains 117 instances in 110 documents. These instances of
gains being labeled as windfalls were analyzed and then categorized according
to the origin of the gain into the following groups: Attorney Fees, Breach of
Contract, Business Profits, Campaign Finance, Charitable Gifts, Criminal Evi-
dence,73 Gambling, Government Budgets (Government Receipts and Govern-
ment Payment), Illegal Kickbacks, Inheritances, Intellectual Property, Litigation,
Oil & Gas (Foreign Oil & Gas and Domestic Oil & Gas), Real Property,
Salaries and Bonuses, Securities (Investments and Entrepreneurship), and two
miscellaneous categories, Other (gains, some of which were nonmonetary,
which did not flow from an identifiable economic transaction) and Unspecified
(gains mentioned generically without reference to any specific gain).
Further collapsing Domestic Oil & Gas and Foreign Oil & Gas, Government
Payment and Government Receipts, and Securities (Investing) and Securities
(Entrepreneur), results in the following Table 111-2.
The most prevalent types of gains that were referred to as a windfall in
the N.Y.T. dataset were Oil & Gas (Foreign and Domestic) profits and
Securities (Investing and Entrepreneur) profits. Oil & Gas profits include
those made by either privately-owned firms or state-owned firms from
exploration, production, refining or sale of petroleum, natural gas or coal or
electricity generation from those inputs. Gains included in the Securities
category were either passive gains by shareholders of sales company stock
or other types of securities (Securities-Investing) or gains by entrepreneurs
from the sale of all or part of the stock of companies that they founded
(Securities-Entrepreneurship). Of the 117 instances, seventeen referred to
Oil & Gas gains and eighteen referred to Securities gains. Together, these
categories accounted for almost thirty percent (30%) of the dataset. The
third largest category was Business Profits, which included profits made by
firms or business owners by virtue of a particular business model or format.
Fourteen occurrences described Business Profits gains.
These major categories all involve marketplace gains-gains negotiated by
private parties. According to the taxonomy proposed by this Article, these gains
73. Though the use of the term "windfall" in this nonmonetary context is surprising at first blush, the
exclusionary rule has been called a windfall to the defendant before. See Kades, supra note 22, at 1565;
Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 -ARv. L. Rav. 820, 848 (1994) (arguing
that although the exclusionary rule may give "windfalls" to guilty defendants, skew litigation incentives
and create negative externalities, the rule is a necessary, but flawed, part of the criminal justice
system.); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV. 757, 794 (1994)
(arguing that excluding wrongfully obtained evidence makes the defendant better off than if the
evidence had not been seized in the first place because it allowed the defendant to realize that he was
under suspicion and act accordingly.). Cf Dan Markel, Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family
lies, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 1147, 1215 (2007) (referring to laws that exempt family members of accused
defendants from charges of harboring or obstruction as conferring a "windfall benefit" on the accused.).
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Table 11-1
Category Instances Percentage
Business Profits 14 11.9658
Foreign Oil & Gas 14 11.9658
Other 11 9.4017
Securities (Investing) 11 9.4017
Government Payment 9 7.6923
Salary/Bonuses 9 7.6923
Real Property 7 5.9829
Securities (Entrepreneur) 7 5.9829
Litigation 6 5.1282
Unspecified 6 5.1282
Government Receipts 4 3.4188
Breach of Contract 3 2.5641
Domestic Oil & Gas 3 2.5641
Intellectual Property 3 2.5641
Charitable Gifts 2 1.7094
Criminal Evidence 2 1.7094
Gambling 2 1.7094
Attorney Fees 1 .8547
Campaign Finance 1 .8547
Illegal Kickbacks 1 .8547
Inheritance 1 .8547
are Earned Windfalls, although some might argue that all or part of each of
those gains could be classified as Excess Earned Windfalls. In fact, marketplace
gains dominated the dataset. Two other large categories involve gains negoti-
ated by private parties, Salary and Bonuses and Real Property. Nine of the
instances referred to an individual's salary or bonus from that individual's
employment. Seven of the instances referred to gains from the sale of real
property. Furthermore, three of the instances referred to gains received by a
party attributable to an intellectual property right. One example of gambling, an
Earned Windfall was described. Together, these marketplace categories account
for sixty-nine of the 117 instances, or 58.97% of the dataset. All of these
marketplace gains would be classified as either Earned Windfalls or Excess
Earned Windfalls in the taxonomy proposed by this Article. In other words,
these are not windfalls at all, but earned returns on capital.
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Table 11-2
Category Instances Percentage
Securities 18 15.3846
Oil & Gas 17 14.5299
Business Profits 14 11.9658
Government Budgets 13 11.1111
Other 11 9.4017
Salary/Bonuses 9 7.6923
Real Property 7 5.9829
Litigation 6 5.1282
Unspecified 6 5.1282
Breach of Contract 3 2.5641
Intellectual Property 3 2.5641
Charitable Gifts 2 1.7094
Criminal Evidence 2 1.7094
Gambling 2 1.7094
Attorney Fees 1 .8547
Campaign Finance 1 .8547
Illegal Kickbacks 1 .8547
Inheritance 1 .8547
The remainder of the dataset were referenced to non-marketplace gains.
The largest non-marketplace category of increases to wealth in the dataset
was Government Budgets (Receipts and Payments). The term "windfall"
was used in these articles to describe either payments to individuals, agen-
cies or firms by governments 74 (9 instances) or governmental revenues (4
instances). 75
The remaining categories contain small numbers of instances each. Inter-
estingly, very few gains that were termed "windfalls" in this dataset were
either Classic Windfalls or Gratuitous Windfalls. One inheritance was men-
tioned in the dataset, along with two examples of charitable donations,
74. The Government Payments to private parties are Regulatory Windfalls and worthy of lengthier
treatment elsewhere.
75. Note that Governmental Receipts as the result of a marketplace transaction were classified
accordingly. For example, if a governmental entity sold securities or real estate, then that gain was
included in the proper marketplace category, whereas revenue to a governmental entity from real estate
taxes was included in the Government Receipts category.
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which would be Gratuitous Windfalls to those charities in this taxonomy.
Three instances were Wrongful Windfalls in which parties to a contract were
said to have received a benefit for which they did not bargain.76
2. Wall Street Journal Dataset
The findings from the W.S.J. dataset are substantially similar to the findings
from the N.YT. dataset. During this time period, the W.S.J. published six
editions per week, or 162 editions. During this time period, the term "windfall"
appeared 126 times in 110 documents. Again, omitting those references to the
proper noun "windfall tax" or "windfall profits tax" leaves a dataset of 116
instances in 101 documents.
Table 11-3
Categories Instances Percentages
Business Profits 15 12.9310
Government Receipts 15 12.9310
Salary/Bonuses 15 12.9310
Domestic Oil & Gas 14 12.0690
Foreign Oil & Gas 12 10.3448
Securities (Investing) 12 10.3448
Real Property 8 6.8966
Securities (Entrepreneur) 8 6.8966
Inheritance 3 2.5862
Intellectual Property 3 2.5862
Litigation 3 2.5862
Other 3 2.5862
Attorney Fees 2 1.7241
Unspecified 2 1.7241
Government Payment 1 0.8621
76. These articles depicted contracts scenarios very much like those discussed by courts as poten-
tially causing windfalls. See, e.g., Cold-Case Classics: Cars Stolen Long Ago Find Their Way Back,
N.Y. Tus, Feb. 11, 2007, at 6 (discussing under unjust enrichment principles who should be awarded a
recovered stolen car-the rightful owner, who recovered from insurance, the insurer, or the bona fide
purchaser for value.).
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Collapsing categories of Oil & Gas (Foreign and Domestic), Government
Budgets (Receipts and Payment) and Securities (Investing and Entrepreneur)
creates the following results:
Table 11-4
Categories Instances Percentages
Oil & Gas 26 22.4138
Securities 20 17.2414
Government Budgets 16 13.7931
Business Profits 15 12.9310
Salary/Bonuses 15 12.9310
Real Property 8 6.8966
Inheritance 3 2.5862
Intellectual Property 3 2.5862
Litigation 3 2.5862
Other 3 2.5862
Attorney Fees 2 1.6949
Unspecified 2 1.6949
Again, these occurrences were coded according to the origin of the gain that
was referenced as a windfall. As with the N.YT. dataset, the term was used to
characterize marketplace gains most often, and this trend was even more
pronounced: marketplace gains were mentioned in eighty-seven of those 116
occurrences, or 74.36%. This number does not include three references to
litigation awards or potential litigation awards. Two of the litigation references
were to settlements obtained by state governments from tobacco companies as a
result of litigation.77 Another article reporting on a Supreme Court case limiting
employment discrimination claims hypothesized about potential windfalls as a
result of employees bringing "stale" claims.78 Litigation awards may merely
compensate a plaintiff from a wrong done by the defendant; in that case, any
77. See Lucette Lagnado, Battle on the Home Front - San Francisco's Massive New Nursing Facility
Draws a Fight as Institutions Lose Favor, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2007, at At (discussing the state of
California's use of the "windfall" proceeds of tobacco litigation for various projects to benefit the
elderly.); Editorial, Tobacco Roadkill, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2007 ("The Clinton Administration filed the
suit .... as an end-run around Congress, which had blocked federal claims to the windfall resulting
from the Medicaid tobacco settlement with the states a year earlier.").
78. See Jess Bravin & Mark H. Anderson, Politics & Economics: High Court Limits ime for Filing
Bias Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., May 30, 2007, at A6 (discussing the Supreme Court case Ledbetter v.
Goodyear ire & Rubber, described by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce as "eliminat[ing] a potential
windfall against employers by employees trying to dredge up stale... claims.").
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sum received would not be a gain at all, but merely a replacement of an
undeserved loss. Sums received in excess of compensatory amounts may be
seen as various types of gains: Earned Windfalls, Excess Earned Windfalls,
Regulatory Windfalls, or even Wrongful Windfalls (in the case of punitive
damages that violate the due process clause 79). The largest non-marketplace
category was Government Budgets, which included 16 occurrences.
The four largest marketplace categories were Oil & Gas (twenty-six occur-
rences), Securities (Entrepreneurship and Investing) (twenty), Business Profits
(fifteen) and Salary/Bonuses (fifteen). Gains resulting from the ownership and
sale of real property were mentioned eight times.
Similar to the N.Y.T. dataset, this dataset does not contain a specific reference
to a Classic Windfall, and only three references to inheritances, which can be
described as Gratuitous Windfalls.
3. Combined Dataset
Combining the two datasets presents a consolidated picture of the use of the
term "windfall" in the media from 233 instances.
B. Targeting Marketplace Gains as Windfalls
The dataset yielded results consistent with the hypothesis that the term
"windfall" is used to label marketplace gains, or Earned Windfalls. Very few of
the windfalls described adhere to the dictionary definition of an unanticipated
benefit not caused by the recipient. Out of the 233 occurrences, not one
described a Classic Windfall, few described Gratuitous Windfalls, and only two
described gambling winnings, a subset of Earned Windfalls commonly mischar-
acterized as Classic Windfalls. The overwhelming majority of the articles in our
dataset described marketplace gains, all of which are Earned Windfalls or,
arguably, Excess Earned Windfalls.
Admittedly, Classic Windfalls may not happen that often, and most Gratuitous
Windfalls may not be newsworthy. Because profits made from business enterprises
and real estate sales may be more frequent and also more interesting to the general
public, finding more references to those types of gains should not be surprising.
However, the fact that the media labels as windfalls these marketplace gains, specifi-
cally, gains that the taxonomy here would classify as Earned Windfalls, is remarkable.
These so-called windfalls are the result of effort and risk-taking: founders starting a
business that is then bought by a larger firm 8 ° songwriters collecting royalties, 1
79. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
80. Andrew Martin, Coke Takes $4 Billion Step Away From Carbonation, N.Y. Tnms, May 26, 1007,
at C1 (describing the $4.1 billion purchase price of Glaceau by Coca-Cola as a "windfall" to the
inventor of Vitaminwater and founder of Glaceau.).
81. Andrew Adam Newman, Journey's Song Gets a Bump From TV Once Again, N.Y. TiMas, June
18, 2007, at C8 (describing an increase in song downloads for Journey's "Don't Stop Believin"' after it
was featured in the series finale of Sopranos.).
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Table HI-5
Category Instances Percentage
Oil & Gas 43 18.4549
Securities 38 16.3090
Business Profits 29 12.4464
Government Budgets 29 12.4464
Salary/Bonuses 24 10.3004
Real Property 15 6.4378
Other 14 6.0086
Litigation 9 3.8627
Intellectual Property 6 2.5751
Inheritance 4 1.7167
Breach of Contract 3 1.2876
Attorney Fees 3 1.2876
Charitable Gifts 2 0.8584
Criminal Evidence 2 0.8584
Gambling 2 0.8584
Unspecified 2 0.8584
Campaign Finance 1 0.4292
Illegal Kickbacks 1 0.4292
82
owners selling shares in successful initial public offerings of their companies,
companies launching new products,83 purchasers seeing an asset increase in value,84
workers receiving anticipated retirement benefits,85 even a new, skilled labor job.86
82. Yvonne Ball, IPOs of B&G Foods and Sirtris Rise, WALL. ST. J., May 30, 2007, at C3 ("Ben
Holmes, publisher of Momingnotes.com, a research company that tracks IPOs, said investors were
becoming wary of IPOs where the company's sponsors stood to make a windfall gain a few months
after their initial investment.").
83. Sam Schechner, Top Online Game Gets an Overhaul, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2007, at W3 ("Priced
at $39.99, on top of the game's $14.99 monthly subscription fee, the upgrade could amount to a
windfall for Blizzard .... ).
84. Matthew L. Wald, Uranium Windfall Opens Choices for the Energy Department, N.Y. TIams,
May 29, 2007, at A12 (reporting that the U.S. government had purchased uranium when prices were
lower, but prices has increased tenfold, resulting in a "windfall.").
85. Fran Hawthorne, New Look for the Nest Egg, N.Y. TbvtEs, April 10, 2007, at C5 (reporting that
companies are beginning to give employees the option to take lump sum retirement funds instead of
receiving defined benefit payments over time, "but experts fear that they might spend that windfall
instead of saving it.").
86. Evan Perez and Corey Dade, Reversal of Fortune: An Immigration Raid Aids Blacks - For a
lime - After Latinos Flee, Factory Shifts to Locals, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2007, at Dl ("For Mr. Royals,
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C. Nonexcessive Excess Windfalls
Part of the analysis here has entertained an argument that some'Earned
Windfalls may be, in whole or part, Excess Earned Windfalls. This argument
would concede that many types of earned profits would be in direct proportion
to the value of the work or capital provided by the recipient, but that profits in
excess of the value of that work or capital, perhaps due to external forces of
luck, would be a Classic Windfall, subject to recapture. However, one of the
most troubling aspects of that thought experiment is that no clear criteria exist
to differentiate reasonable profits from unreasonable profits, and any such
criteria would invariably have to adapt from industry to industry, asset to asset,
occupation to occupation. At this point in the Article, then, our data could give
guidance if any trends were identified regarding criteria that could be used to
categorize marketplace gains as Excess Earned Windfalls and not mere Earned
Windfalls. Unfortunately, the references in our dataset do not follow any clear
criteria. Some of the windfalls mentioned are small; 87 some are large.8 8 Some
are unexpected; 89 some are planned.90 Some of the windfalls seem to reflect
expected rates of return. 91 Therefore, a systematic analysis is not possible with
these datasets.
If any lessons are to be gleaned from the media dataset, those lessons may be
that windfalls are in the eye of the beholder. Whether a particular gain is seen as
a windfall depends on the speaker's view of recipient. For example, when the
two datasets are combined, the largest category labeled as windfalls contains
references to oil and gas companies, particularly foreign oil and gas companies.
the new opportunities at Crider amounted to a windfall after months of erratic work through a
temporary labor agency.").
87. See Gary S. Becker and Richard A. Posner, How to Make the Poor Poorer, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24,
2007, at All (referring to an increase in the minimum wage as a windfall for teenagers and second
workers in a household.); Alan Murray, Bush Health Care Plan Finds Business Backers, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 24, 2007, at A6 (describing a potential windfall if taxpayers are allowed to deduct costs of private
health insurance.).
88. See Miguel Helft, Numbers Are Out on How Rich the YouTube Deal Was, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8,
2007, at C2 (reporting that following the acquisition of YouTube by Google for $1.65 billion in stock,
the founders and various other YouTube shareholders received stock worth hundreds of millions of
dollars.); Nelson D. Schwartz, Who Might Escape Bausch Without a Scratch?, N.Y. TiMES, June 24,
2007, at Al (reporting that the CEO of Bausch & Lomb received $40 million upon the sale of the
company.).
89. See Second Thoughts Pay Off, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 19, 2007, at A10 (detailing the story of man who
purchased a penthouse for $15.7 million, then had second thoughts and sold it for $27 million).
90. See Nicholas Confessore, Late-Session Measures Stir Scrutiny and Skepticism, N.Y. Tm s, June
21, 2007, at B5 (reporting that "some owners bought the [race]tracks at a premium in the expectation
that the lottery terminals would yield windfall profits.").
91. For example, one N.Y.T. article described a real estate developer who had purchased four
brownstones in the late 1970s for $350,000 and then sold in 2007 for $12 million. J. Alex Tarquinio,
Minding the Store in a Condo, N.Y. TIMEs, April 11, 2007, at C9 ("Mr. Cooney used most of his
windfall to buy two retail condos."). Although $12 million seems like a very large amount of money, it
reflects a return rate of 12.5% if the property were bought in 1977 and sold in 2007. This rate of return
is higher than the national real estate appreciation average, but comparable to New York real estate
appreciation averages.
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Disdain for the recipient may be largest predictor of whether a gain will be
called a windfall,92 but disdain should hardly be a criteria for categorizing
Excess Earned Windfalls, subject to recapture.
HI. WHAT DOES THE LAW CONSIDER A WINDFALL?
A. Windfalls in Law and Equity
Although the term "windfall" was used to describe myriad types of economic
gains in the popular media datasets, legal scholars should also be interested to
know what constitutes a windfall under the law. Windfalls are disfavored in the
law,93 and although windfalls are not specifically mentioned in the maxims of
equity, historically courts have been conscious of avoiding windfall gains when
applying both concepts of law and of equity, such as restitution and unjust
enrichment. However, the law is predisposed not to identify gains, particularly
contract gains, as windfalls and void otherwise enforceable contracts. 94 Particu-
larly when a contract has been completed, courts are content to preserve the
status quo. 95 Because the definition of windfall is not neatly contained in any
state statute, commercial code or treatise, a set of modem cases in which the
term "windfall" was used was analyzed to determine what types of economic
gains courts consider to be windfalls.
B. Court Opinion Dataset
To analyze the use of the term "windfall" in U.S. courts, 100 cases in which
the word "windfall" appears were chosen in the following way: using the
.Westlaw database "allstates," 96 a dataset was created that included the first 100
cases retrieved when searching for the term "windfall" between the dates of
January 1, 2007 and July 7, 2007. The first case retrieved was decided January
29, 2007 and the 100th case retrieved was decided on May 10, 2007.97 This
time period is roughly equivalent to the time period reflected in both the N.Y.T.
and W.S.J. datasets. This dataset includes cases from thirty-three states and the
District of Columbia.
92. See discussion infra Section VI(A).
93. See INS Investigations Bureau, Inc. v. Lee, 784 N.E.2d 566 (Ind. App. 2004) ("The law disfavors
a windfall or a double recovery.")
94. See Kull, supra note 25, at 5 ("[T]he characteristic and traditional response of our legal system
to cases of mistake and frustrated contracts is neither to relieve the disadvantaged party nor to assign
the loss to the superior risk bearer, but to leave things alone.").
95. See id. at 6-8 (identifying the "windfall principle" that "requires losses to the parties under a
frustrated contract be left to lie where they fall").
96. The database "allstates" contains only court opinions from the courts of all fifty states and the
District of Columbia. These state court cases generally apply state law and hear cases on various
state-law topics. In addition, these cases are being decided by either an intermediate appellate state
court or the state supreme court.
97. By searching the allstates database during the same time frame for all cases in which the word
"law" appears, I estimate that the database contains a total of 12,023 cases that were decided during that
timeframe.
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The cases in this dataset were coded first by the question of law that was
being decided by the court writing the opinion. Sixteen general categories
emerged: Breach of Contract, Insurance Law, Real Property, Family Law,
Criminal Law, Attorney Fees, Employment Law, General Business Law, Land-
lord/Tenant Law, Medical Malpractice, Workers Compensation, Personal
Injury, Trusts and Estates, the Class Action certification procedure, Municipal
Taxation and Bankruptcy. Of these categories, at least seven can be viewed as
involving marketplace transactions: Breach of Contract, Insurance Law, Real
Property, Attorney Fees, Employment Law (although some cases were contract
and some were discrimination cases), Business Law, Landlord/Tenant Law and
Bankruptcy.
Table II-1
Category Instances Percentage
Breach of Contract 14 14.000
Insurance 14 14.000
Real Property 14 14.000
Family Law 12 12.000
Criminal Law 9 9.000
Attorney Fees 6 6.000
Employment Law 5 5.000
Business Law 4 4.000
Landlord/Tenant 4 4.000
Medical Malpractice 4 4.000
Workers Compensation 4 4.000
Personal Injury 3 3.000
Trusts & Estates 3 3.000
Class Action Certification 2 2.000
Municipal Taxation 2 2.000
Bankruptcy 1 1.000
Almost half of the cases (42%) involved the interpretation of a contract for
goods and services, an insurance contract or a contract for the sale of real
property. The next largest category consisted of family law cases in which the
court was dividing assets or adjusting alimony or child support payments.
In addition, the dataset was coded based on what type of gain was being described
as a windfall. Generally, the courts in this dataset did not use the term "windfall"
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colloquially;98 instead, the term was used to describe a type of payment that the law
does not allow. Therefore, virtually all of the gains described as windfalls in the court
cases would be categorized in this taxonomy as wrongful windfalls.99 In the majority
of the cases, the term was used to describe a payment that would confer a benefit
upon someone who was undeserving under the law. Generally, the payment would
seek to compensate someone who had not suffered a loss. The next two categories
describe cases in which either a payment was described that would permit a double
recovery for someone or that would relieve a defendant from making a payment that
was otherwise a legal obligation. In only one case was the term used to describe a
very large return on an investment, and in two cases the term was used to describe an
excessive payment. In both cases involving excessive payments, the term "windfall"
was used by the losing party to describe the payment, not the court. In other words,
the court did not believe the payment to be a wrongful windfall merely because of its
excessive nature. 1°°
Table 111-2
Character Instances Percentage
Undue Benefit 54 54.000
Double Benefit 24 24.000
Undue Relief from Due Payment 19 19.000
Large Return on Investment 1 1.000
Excessive Payment 2 2.000
Because the term "windfall" may be used by the court in a way that does not
reflect either the holding or the reasoning of the court, the cases in the dataset
were also coded based on whether the speaker choosing the term "windfall" was
one of the parties to the case, the court below, the judge writing the court
opinion or a judge writing a dissenting or concurring opinion. In most cases, the
98. In only one case in the dataset did a judge refer to an economic gain as a windfall in the popular
sense of the word. In this case, the judge was describing a gain that was not the subject of the lawsuit.
See Egle v. Egle, 963 So.2d 454 (La. App. Ct. 2007) (referring to profits received by certain trusts as
being windfalls due to their large return on investment, although those profits were not related to the
outcome of the case involving the governance of those trusts.).
99. None of these cases involved thefts or other types of Illegal Windfalls.
100. See Dobrin v. Middagh, No. A113042, 2007 WL 1785475 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. June 21, 2007)
(court did not agree with tenant that newly negotiated rents were a windfall to the landord.); Lantum v.
Export Enter., Inc., 866 N.E.2d 437 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (court did not agree with defendant that
towing fees assessed for motor vehicle registration violations were windfalls to the towing companies
due to their excessive nature.).
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opinion writer was the speaker of the term. However, in nineteen cases (19%),
the court was merely pointing out that one of the parties argued that a particular
outcome of the case would bestow a windfall on the other party. In one of the
cases, the court agreed; in the other eighteen cases, the court disagreed.
Table 111-3
Speaker Instances Percentage
Court 75 75.000
Dissent 5 5.000
Trial Court (rev'd) 1 1.000
Losing Party 18 18.000
Winning Party 1 1.000
IV. WHAT Do LAWMAKERS & POLICYMAKERS CONSIDER.A WINDFALL?
One assertion of this Article is that public mischaracterization of Excess
Earned Windfalls as Classic Windfalls subject to redistribution is that the end
result will be laws that capture these earned profits. This Article then assumes
that one possible result of these types of laws is the redirection of useful capital
to less efficient uses once the prospect of large gains has been eradicated. To
support this assertion, a dataset of congressional speeches was compiled that
used the term "windfall."
To analyze the use of the term "windfall" in speeches before the U.S.
Congress, every piece of testimony in the "USTestimony" Westlaw database
generated between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2007 was selected in
which the word "windfall" appeared. In that year, the House of Representatives
was in session 164 days, 01 and the Senate was in session 180 days. 10 2 Based on
these numbers, the two houses may have generated over 5,000 individual pieces
of testimony. 103 Again, the term "windfall" is not used by a large percentage of
those testifying, but examining when the term is used may be useful.
At first glance, this congressional testimony dataset contained 174 unique
utterances of "windfall" in 113 unique testimony transcripts. However, many of
these usages were mere uses of the proper noun "Windfall Profits Tax" to refer
101. See The Library of Congress, Days in Session-House of Representatives, http://thomas.loc.gov/
home/ds/h11O.html (last visited July 31, 2009).
102. See The Library of Congress, Days in Session-Senate, http://thomas.loc.govlhome/ds/
s1101.html (last visited July 31, 2009).
103. By choosing 17 congressional days at random and identifying the number of individual
documents that correspond to those days in the Westlaw "USTestimony" database, a number reflecting
the number of testimony documents generated per day was estimated for each house. Given the number
of congressional days in each year, it was estimated that 5,393 documents were in the USTestimony
database for 2007.
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to either the 1980 Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax104 or one of several proposed
taxes modeled after that tax105 or the proper noun "Windfall Elimination
Provision," which is a current, and controversial, provision in the Social Secu-
rity Act.106 Because a speaker would necessarily have to use the term "windfall"
to refer to these laws, no inferences can be drawn regarding their usages.
Therefore, thirteen uses of "Windfall Profits Tax" and twenty-three uses of
"Windfall Elimination Provision" were disregarded. The amended dataset con-
tained 138 unique utterances in 102 unique testimony transcripts. In addition,
three speakers used the term to refer to noneconomic gains;" 7 these instances
were also disregarded, leaving 135 unique utterances in ninety-nine unique
testimony transcripts.
In the dataset, speakers used the term eighty-nine times to describe a benefit
that was created (or was claimed to be created) by either an existing law or the
status quo. Generally, the speaker was criticizing or defending the current legal
regime. At times, the speaker was testifying regarding new legislation that was
proposed to remedy the purported windfall; other times, the speaker was
involved in hearings that were merely investigatory in nature and no new
legislation had been introduced as yet. Speakers also used the term forty-seven
times to critique or support new legislation. In all of these instances, speakers
either used the term to label economic gains as undeserved windfalls or to
defend economic benefits as being deserved. In six instances, the speakers used
the term as part of a straw man rhetorical device, 0 8 claiming that "some say"
that a particular benefit would be a windfall, only then to argue against that
104. Crude Oil Profits Tax of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229, codified at 26 U.S.C.
§§ 4986-4998 and scattered sections (repealed 1988).
105. See, e.g., Consumer Windfall Excess Oil Profits Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 4276, 109th
Cong. (2005).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7) (disallowing Social Security benefits or a portion thereof to certain
government workers who receive a pension.).
107. FISA Modernization: Hearing on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Before the S.
Comm. on Senate Select Intelligence, 110th Cong. (May 1, 2007) (statement of James Dempsey),
available at 2007 WL 1277872 ("Everything we know about the digital revolution indicates that, on
balance, it has been a windfall for the snoopers .... "); Treatment of Detainees: Hearing Before S.
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 110th Cong. (July 26, 2007) (statement of Maj. Gen. Paul D. Eaton),
available at 2007 WL 2138876 ("For me, the most compelling story was by a retired Marine Major
General, who described the capture of a Japanese Soldier, subsequent appropriate treatment and
eventual windfall of information and help."); Sex Crimes and the Internet: Hearing Before H. Comm.
on Judiciary, 110th Cong. (Oct. 17, 2007) (statement of Laurence E. Rothenberg), available at 2007 WL
3037142 ("This will help to ensure that sex offenders who have failed to register in conformity with
SORNA do not enjoy a windfall immunity to federal criminal liability based on fortuities of timing in
their travel among jurisdictions .... ").
108. The "straw man" argument refers to an argument in which the speaker creates an unnamed
critic to espouse an idea, then refutes the idea. Many times, the characterization of the straw man's
argument is a simplification or overstatement of real-world criticism. See Helene Cooper, Some Obama
Enemies Are Made Totally of Straw, N.Y. TiMEs, May 24, 2009, at A20 (analyzing President Barack
Obama's use of the straw man rhetorical device.).
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description. 0 9 In one instance, the term was part of a long quotation that the
speaker chose to incorporate into his remarks as supporting his assertions. 1 10
Almost half of the utterances (44.44%) were made in connection with some
aspect of the energy industry. Thirty-four of the 135 utterances related to either
current "cap and trade" regimes established in foreign countries or the proposed
"6cap and trade" regime to be instituted in the U.S. pursuant to the American
Clean Energy & Security Act of 2009. " Twenty-two appearances of the word
"windfall" appear in testimony transcripts describing profits of foreign oil and
gas producers such as Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Venezuela. U.S. oil and
gas profits were described as windfalls in four instances.
Though no other single category was as dominant as these three energy-
related categories, the other major category was the current patent regime, with
eleven appearances of the word "windfall" in relation to profits generated by
patents or patent litigation. The telecommunications industry, particularly how
access and fees are regulated, also generated nine uses. Interestingly, these
so-called windfalls that are being described may fit into the Regulatory Windfall
category as property rights that are given to a private individual. t Though
private individuals pay for the product or service generating the profit, the
amount to be charged reflects government intervention foreclosing vigorous
price competition 1 3 or granting the use of public property for private benefit.' 1 4
Another small category that seemed to be the target in 2007 was the lending
industry. The term "windfall" was used six times to refer to proposed loan
modifications for mortgage holders as a result of the collapse of the real estate
bubble and once each to refer to credit card industry practices and student loan
industry practices.
109. Loan Modification and Foreclosure Prevention: Hearing on H.R. 3915 and H.R. 4178 Before
the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. (Dec. 6, 2007) (statement of Sheila C. Bair), available at
2007 WL 4285179 ("Some have expressed concern that restructuring subprime loans to a long-term,
sustainable mortgage at the starter rate will result in a windfall for subprime borrowers.").
110. Global Climate Change: Hearing on the Kyoto Protocol Before the H. Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 110th Cong. (May 15, 2007) (statement by W. David Montgomery), available at 2007 WL
1429182 (quoting the British Sunday Times as reporting that windfalls from selling emission credits are
being used to build new, less clean, power plants). The speaker uses the word windfall in his own words
later in his testimony. See id. ("Exactly such a deal was struck to get Russia and Ukraine to join the
Kyoto Protocol; both countries refused to join Kyoto unless they were given generous headroom that
was akin to printing a huge windfall of free extra permits.").
111. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).
112. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 47, at 551 (citing "broadcasting rights" as a giving.).
113. See Free Trade: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Interstate Commerce, Trade & Tourism of the
S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 110th Cong. (Apr. 18, 2007) (statement of Lori Wallach), available at
2007 WL 1143804 ("The University of Minnesota's School of Pharmacy found that the VVTO and
NAFTA windfall patent extensions cost U.S. consumers at least $6 billion in higher drug prices and
increased Medicare and Medicaid costs, nearly $1.5 billion just for drugs then under patent.").
114. See Digital Future of the United States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and the
Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, ll0th Cong. (Apr. 19, 2007) (statement of John
Muleta), available at. 2007 WL 1172426 ("[A] licensee that earns billions using a spectrum license that
cost a fraction of one year's annual revenue doesn't share that windfall with the public that owns the
spectrum.").
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Table IV-1
Category Instances Percentage
Cap & Trade 34 25.1852
Foreign Oil & Gas 22 16.2963
Intellectual Property (Patents) 11 8.1482
Telecommunications Industry 9 6.6666
Loan Modifications 6 4.4444
Infrastructure Projects 6 4.4444
Tax (General) 5 3.7037
Crop Insurance 4 2.9630
Domestic Oil & Gas 4 2.9630
International Trade 4 2.9630
Health Care 3 2.2222
Natural Resources 3 2.2222
Social Security 3 2.2222
Airlines 2 1.4815
Antitrust 2 1.4815
Government Contracts 2 1.4815
Hedge Funds 2 1.4815
Litigation 2 1.4815
Veterans Affairs 2 1.4815
Charitable Donations 1 .7407
Credit Cards 1 .7407
Credit Rating Agencies 1 .7407
Currency 1 .7407
FEMA 1 .7407
Illegal Gains 1 .7407
Real Estate 1 .7407
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 1 .7407
Student Loans 1 .7407
Unlike in the media and case law datasets, in the congressional testimony,
many speakers used the term "windfall" multiple times in the same testimony.
Therefore, the dataset was revised to reflect how many individual testimony
transcripts used the term "windfall" and in what manner. The ordering is
basically the same, but the percentages are slightly different.
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Table IV-2
[Vol. 8:339
Category Testimonies Percentage
Cap & Trade 23 23.2323
Foreign Oil & Gas 17 17.1717
Intellectual Property (Patents) 8 8.0808
Infrastructure Projects 5 5.0505
Telecommunications Industry 4 4.0404
Loan Modifications 4 4.0404
Domestic Oil & Gas 3 3.0303
Health Care 3 3.0303
International Trade 3 3.0303
Natural Resources 3 3.0303
Social Security 3 3.0303
Airlines 2 2.0202
Antitrust 2 2.0202
Crop Insurance 2 2.0202
Government Contracts 2 2.0202
Hedge Funds 2 2.0202
Litigation 2 2.0202
Tax (General) 2 2.0202
Veterans Affairs 2 2.0202
Charitable Donations 1 1.0101
Credit Cards 1 1.0101
Credit Rating Agencies 1 1.0101
Currency 1 1.0101
FEMA 1 1.0101
Illegal Gains •1 1.0101
Real Estate 1 1.0101
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 1 1.0101
Student Loans 1 1.0101
Unsurprisingly, those who testified in front of Congress in 2007 used the term
"windfall" to describe Excess Earned Windfalls received by politically unpopu-
lar groups, such as oil and gas producers, and Regulatory Windfalls generated
by government-granted rights such as carbon allowances and patent rights.
Some Excess Earned Windfalls were disparaged as windfalls when the speaker
THE WINDFALL MY'rH
viewed them to be the result of a regulatory "loophole"11 5 or a poorly negoti-
ated contract. 
16
V. LoOKING BEHIND THE WINDFALL RHETORIC
A. Windfalls as Inappropriate Gains to Undeserving Recipients
In both the media and legislative datasets, many speakers clearly see Excess
Earned Windfalls as inappropriate. However, the question of why a particular
Excess Earned Windfall is so undeserved and inappropriate as to render it a
Classic Windfall, Wrongful Windfall or Illegal Windfall is more difficult to
discern. Critics are often drawn to characterize large economic returns as
windfalls, but size is not always critical. The character, or perceived character,
of the recipient, the work of the recipient, and even the demeanor of the
recipient tends to color the view of the Excess Earned Windfall. In these
situations, the unpopularity of the recipient seems to determine the gain's status
as an undeserved windfall, not the notion of external forces of luck.
1. The Blackstone Bill
One example of an unpopular recipient that became a candidate for windfall
profits taxation is Blackstone Group, L.P., a management group for private
equity funds,11 7 which sold "units" to the public as a publicly-traded partnership
on June 22, 2007. Private equity funds, and in particular hedge funds, have
drawn criticism in past years for being unregulated investment vehicles that
create high returns on investment for a small number of wealthy investors. In
addition, fund managers are also seen as reaping many of those benefits,
particularly through the management fee structure known as "two and twenty." 18
Amid this envy and mistrust, Blackstone announced that it would go public.119
115. See Equity in the Tax Code: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong.
(Sept. 6, 2007) (statement of Leo Hindery, Jr.), available at 2007 WL 2683263 ("A tax loophole the size
of a. Mack Truck is right now generating unwarranted and unfair windfalls to a privileged group of
money managers....").
116. See Federal Crop Insurance: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Gen. Farm Commodities of the
H. Comm. on Agric., I10th Cong. (June 7, 2007) (statement of Robert A. Robinson), available at 2007
WL 1668787 ("In fact, [RMA's attempt to renegotiate the contracts] offers insurance companies and
their agents a windfall.:').
117. See The Blackstone Group L.P., Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933 on
Form S-1, at 1 (Mar. 22, 2007) ("We are a leading global alternative asset manager and provider of
financial advisory services ... with assets under management of approximately $78.7 billion as of
March 1, 2007.").
118. See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 3 (2008) (describing the standard practice of private equity fund managers earning an
annual management fee of two percent of the fund principal and twenty percent of the profits on that
principal, also known as "carried interest.") [hereinafter Fleischer, Two and Twenty].
119. See Andrew Ross Sorkin & Peter Edmonston, A Titan of Private Equity May Go Public, N.Y.
TImEs, Mar. 17, 2007, at CI (detailing that Blackstone's executives "are routinely paid more than $50
million a year" and that co-founder Stephen A. Schwarzman, who "is said to regularly pay himself in
excess of $300 million annually," could reap an IPO "windfall .... worth several billion dollars.").
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The complex structure of the Blackstone IPO generally created a manage-
ment entity that collected the lucrative management fees generated from the
funds that Blackstone Group managed, and this entity, a limited partnership,
issued the limited partnership units to the public."12 Though the vast majority of
publicly-traded issuers in the U.S. are corporations, Blackstone would be one of
very few publicly traded "master limited partnerships" 12' and would be traded
on the New York Stock Exchange. Co-founders Stephen A. Schwarzman and
Peter G. Peterson were reported to be selling some of their holdings in Black-
stone in the IPO for large sums. 1 2 2 In turn, these large sums captured the
regulatory imaginations of Congress and spawned no fewer than three bills
123
targeted to attempt to erase some of those gains by amending the tax code.124
The charge against Blackstone was that the entity was sidestepping the tax
laws governing partnerships and corporations on several levels. In the words of
Senator Max Baucus, "[the tax code is a roadmap for law-abiding citizens and
businesses to pay what they fairly owe, not an obstacle course to be gamed and
gotten around. ' 125 The two largest tax advantages that favored the Blackstone
structure were the taxation of the management fees and the flow-through
taxation of partnerships generally. Most individuals' salaries, earned through
their utilization of their human capital, results in income that is taxed at an
ordinary income rate of up to 35%; however, the twenty percent carried interest
characteristic of private equity funds, though actually merely management fees
for services, is structured so that the fee is first deferred and then taxed at the
15% capital gains rate. 126 Not only could a fund structured as a corporation not
be able to earn fees at the 15% capital gains rate for its management services, it
would have encountered both a tax at the corporate level of 35% and then its
120. See Form S-1, supra note 117, at 10-11 (describing the organizational structure of all of the
Blackstone funds, with The Blackstone Group L.P., the issuer, holding equity interests in these funds,
with the "[mianagement fees, transaction fees, carried interest, incentive fees and other fees received by
subsidiaries of Blackstone Holdings" insuring to the benefit of the issuer.).
121. See LARRY E. RIsmIN & JEFFREY M. LIPsHAw, UN1NCORPORATED BusINEss ENTITIES 407-08 (4th
ed. 2009) (detailing briefly the rise of the master limited partnership in the 1980s and ultimate decline
of popularity.).
122. Although an even larger payout was rumored, perhaps because of regulatory and litigation
uncertainty, the final pricing of the IPO shares generated returns of $677 million for Schwarzman (who
retained a 24% stake in Blackstone Group) and $1.88 billion for Peterson (who retired with a 4%
stake). See Andrew Ross Sorkin, A Glamorous Public Debut for Blackstone, N.Y. TIMEs, June 23, 2007,
at C3.
123. S. 1624, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced by Sen. Max Baucus); H.R. 2785, 110th Cong. (2007)
(introduced by Rep. Peter Welch); H.R. 2834, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced by Rep. Sander Levin).
124. For a thorough analysis of the arguments for and against each of these proposed tax changes,
see generally Victor Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone, 61 TAX L. REV. 89 (2008) [hereinafter Fleischer,
Taxing Blackstone].
125. Associated Press, Blackstone's Creative Accounting Scrutinized, www.msnbc.com, July 13,
2007, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19751869/ (quoting Baucus, the chair of the Senate
Finance Committee).
126. See Fleischer, Two and Twenty, supra note 118, at 4 ("A partnership profits interest is the single
most tax-efficient form of compensation available without limitation to highly paid executives.").
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shareholders would have been hit with another tax on the dividends. 127 The
difference then on profits earned by Blackstone the publicly-traded partnership
versus profits earned by a hypothetical Blackstone corporation would be substan-
tial. Therefore, a strong argument for equity in taxation would urge a change in
the tax code to eliminate this advantage (or disadvantage). 128
However, the bills that were introduced in response to the Blackstone IPO
were narrowly focused on private equity funds, specifically those that chose to
go public.1 29 Increasing the tax on a handful of firms1 3' does not seem to further
loftier goals of tax equity for commonly situated taxpayers or even raise
revenues. In addition, support for the bill waned after supporters realized that
the new tax rule would not have retroactive effect on the Blackstone founders.1 31
Without the usefulness of a particularly unsympathetic recipient of a "windfall,"
equalizing future tax treatment withdrew from the regulatory forefront.
The legislative response to the Blackstone IPO, whether justified by equity
concerns or issues of ensuring compliance with law, was more a response to a
perceived windfall by an undeserving recipient than a thoughtful response to an
overlooked tax provision. Particularly once the Blackstone IPO was not as
successful1 32 as predicted,1 33 public attention went elsewhere.
127. See Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone, supra note 124, at 96-97 (calculating that $500 million of
profits generated by the new publicly traded entity would flow through to its "unitholders" as eventually
$425 million after taxes, compared to a hypothetical corporate Blackstone, which would only give $276
million to its shareholders after taxes).
128. See id. at 114 (noting that S. 1624, which would address the taxation of carried interest
generally, could address gamesmanship, but would not address egalitarian goals).
129. See id. at 91-92, 109-16 (noting that though the narrow scope of the bill might have made it
politically viable, the limited target of the bill makes it justifiable only as a response to regulatory
gamesmanship by "these guys" that "play by a different set of rules").
130. Blackstone was not the first private equity fund to go public, or the first to go public as an entity
taxed as a partnership. Earlier that year, for example, Fortress Investment Group LLC had gone public
as a limited liability company. See Fortress Investment Group LLC, Registration Statement Under the
Securities Act of 1933 on Form S-1, Amend. No. 6 (Feb. 8, 2007). KKR announced an initial public
offering in July 2007, but did not complete it after several postponements. See KKR & Co., L.P.
Registration Withdrawal Request (June 24, 2009).
131. In a July 29, 2007 column, Andrew Ross Sorkin argues that the "Blackstone Bill" had been in
the works for a while, and therefore its introduction after the announcement of the Blackstone IPO did
not mean it was an envious response to reports of founder Schwarzman's wealth. See Andrew Ross
Sorkin, In Defense of Schwarzman, N.Y. TiMsS, July 29, 2007, at C6. However, the fact that the bill
slowly died after the IPO buzz faded throws his argument into question.
132. Though no "Blackstone Bill" was passed, the threat of regulatory scrutiny may have hampered
the Blackstone IPO. See The Blackstone Group, L.P., Registration Statement Amend. No. 9 (July 21, 2007)
(listing as a "Risk Factor" that "[o]ur structure involves complex provisions of U.S. federal income tax law for
which no clear precedent or authority may be available. Our structure also is subject to potential legislative,
judicial or administrative change and differing interpretations, possibly on a retroactive basis.").
133. Whether an IPO is successful or not is open to debate. Shares of Blackstone were offered to the
public at $31 per share, and rose to $38 the first day of trading. However, the shares declined during the
first week. See Conrad de Aenlle, Some Experts at Timing Go for Cash, N.Y TLt s, July 7, 2007, at C6.
However, an argument may be made that unlike other issuers, the extremely financially savvy founders
of Blackstone priced their shares at the market price, not allowing their underwriters to employ the
standard underpricing model. See Christine Hurt, Initial Public Offerings and the Failed Promise of
2010]
380 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY
2. Foreign Oil and Gas Producers
As shown in both the media dataset and the congressional testimony dataset,
oil and gas producers are frequent targets of windfall labeling. In the combined
media dataset, twenty-six of the 233 uses of the word "windfall" targeted
foreign oil and gas profits. In the congressional testimony dataset, twenty-two of
the 135 uses of the term targeted foreign oil and gas profits. Though oil and gas
profits generally are targeted as windfalls, profits by foreign countries, particu-
larly regimes in which the oil producers are owned by the government, are
particularly criticized. Increased demand and interrupted supply of crude oil and
refined gasoline create profits for many parties, but the term "windfall" is often
assigned to those recent profits by countries that are enemies or uneasy allies of
the United States: Russia, 134 Saudi Arabia, 135 Venezuela, 136 and Ian. 1 3 7 Speak-
ers may even express concern that the additional purchasing power that these
windfall profits bring will have security concerns for the United States.38
Unfortunately, the logic behind these arguments is not that the windfall is
causing national security concerns. Rather, because the foreign profits create
concerns for the U.S., these profits are undeserved windfalls.
B. Windfalls as Zero-Sum Defeats for More-Deserving Payors
In other situations, the undeserved characterization of the gain seems related
to the comparatively more-deserving nature of the payor. In many cases, if a
payee is getting an excess profit, then the payor must be assuming some sort of
excess loss. At times, this criticism may be quite apt if the payor is somehow
tricked or otherwise subject to duress or confusion, creating a Wrongful Wind-
fall. However, courts sparingly use the laws voiding transactions because of
fraud, duress, undue influence or unconscionability, thereby treating Excess
Earned Windfalls as Wrongful Windfalls. Instead, lawmakers may want to
protect certain payors from unfair bargaining by legislatively capping the
Disintermediation, 2 ENTEp. Bus. L.J. 703, 732-38 (2008) (describing how some seasoned issuers may
try to minimize underpricing without alienating the demand-increasing value of Wall Street underwriters.).
134. See Russia on the Eve of Elections: Hearing before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Oct. 30,
2007, available at 2007 WL 3171921 (statement of Tom Lantos, Chair) ("With this enormous windfall
[from high price of oil], Mr. Putin has been able to buy off public opinion in Russia.").
135. See Thomas L. Friedman, The Power of Green, N.Y. TIMES, April 15, 2007, at F4 (hypothesiz-
ing that recent oil windfalls "has stilled all talk of reform" in Saudi Arabia.).
136. See Simon Romero, Chavez Ends Busy Week Aiding Venezuela's Latin Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24,
2007, atA4 (positing that President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela was using "windfall" oil profits to counter U.S.
influence in Latin America by giving aid to its neighbors Nicaragua, Ecuador and Argentina.).
137. See Iran Issues: Hearing Before Nat'l Sec. & For Affairs Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on
Oversight & Gov't Reform, (Oct. 30, 2007) (statement of Karim Sadjadpour) ("Despite the record oil
windfall, Iranians are experiencing increaged inflation and unemployment .... ).
138. See Threat Assessment: Hearing Before the Sen. Select Comm., (Jan. 11, 2007) (statement of
John D. Negroponte, Dir. Nat'l Intelligence) ("[High and escalating demand for oil and gas fueled by
five years of unusually robust world economic growth have resulted in higher prices and windfall profits
for producers. Producer nations benefiting from higher prices, and the potential political, economic, and
even military advantages include several countries that are hostile to US [sic) interests.").
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amount of profit that the payee can extract from them. Laws against usury and
predatory lending are examples of this type of well-meaning regulation that
converts Excess Earned Windfalls into Illegal Windfalls. If the abnormal portion
of an Earned Windfall is the result of inferior bargaining positions, asymmetries
of information or sharp business practices, then the public may have an interest
in the payor retaining that abnormal portion. To deter that type of transaction,
legislation may treat the Excess Earned Windfall as an Illegal Windfall.
For Excess Earned Windfalls that result from exchanges bargained for at
arms-length, though, arguments against the excess portion not only focus on the
unbridled power of the recipient, but also on the sympathetic stance of the
payee, particularly when the payee is the consuming public. Profits as a result of
high gas prices, for example, are frequently labeled Excess Earned Windfalls
that come at the expense of consumers. In addition, arguments often invoke the
sanctity of the consumer at large. If tort victims' recoveries are not capped
against manufacturers of products, for example, then manufacturers will be
forced to increase prices of goods sold to consumers, resulting in a windfall to
plaintiffs at the hands of consumers.
Human nature motivates critics to surmise that if someone is getting some-
thing then someone else is losing something. In fact, many Excess Earned
Windfalls fall into this category, given the nature of marketplace exchanges. In
market situations, parties with atypical demand face prices above their preferred
price. For example, consumers might be willing to pay $4 a gallon for gas
because they understand the importance of fuel to their own economies, but
they would prefer to pay less. Even though some consumers are not as willing
to pay $4 a gallon for gas, as long as others are, then the price will not change.
These consumers will be even happier to see the price capped.
In other situations, payees may not feel that they are freely making certain
payments. Manufacturers understand the legal environment of tort liability prior
to manufacturing goods, but may not consider a tort judgment the basis of a
marketplace exchange. Businesses may also understand existing intellectual
property law, but do not want to have to pay for the domain names that match
their businesses, in use by others in good or bad faith. Evacuees from floods or
hurricanes may be happy to see a hotel on the interstate but do not feel that they
are freely paying the increased room rate that the hotelier is charging.
Whether the payee believes herself to be a voluntary payee or not, excess
windfalls with an identifiable and sympathetic payee or payee group are vulner-
able to criticisms. These criticisms may come from the payees themselves or another
group invoking the concerns of a larger group, such as consumers or taxpayers.
1. Domestic Oil and Gas Producers
Just as critics are quick to target foreign oil and gas profits as windfalls to
undeserving regimes, critics are just as harsh to domestic oil and gas producers.
In addition to oil and gas profits going to an unpopular recipient, policy makers
see an easy connection between profits of oil and gas companies and the prices
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that taxpayers pay for gasoline, electricity, air travel, natural gas and heating
oil.' 39 Because of our energy dependence, the prices of these everyday items
affect the budgets of most U.S. residents. Rising energy prices limit the life-
styles of retail consumers, who must cut back on travel, heating and cooling, or
other expenditures to offset the high prices. In addition, high fuel prices may
increase prices of other everyday goods such as food and furniture.
During times of high energy prices, politicians can easily win taxpayer favor
by proposing to redistribute the profits of oil and gas companies. 140 Though
these profits will not directly increase consumer income or even decrease
energy prices, consumers seem to be content with these profits being simply
disgorged by the recipient. In fact, legislation proposing a windfall profits tax
has been introduced in each legislative session since 2000, paralleling the rise in
gas prices this decade. 4 '
Oil and gas profits are an easy target for windfall profits tax proposals
because these profits have been taxed before in recent memory. In 1979, the
Carter Administration announced a transition to deregulate the oil and gas
industry in the United States to promote competition and ensure long-term
supply. 14 2 Because energy prices had been kept artificially low, some recog-
nized that oil and gas producers would benefit greatly from price deregula-
tion. 143 To flatten out this "giving"' 44 or "Regulatory Windfall," regulators
139. See Gas Prices, Oil Co. Profits & the American Consumer: Hearing Before the Oversight &
Investigations Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, May 22, 2007, available at 2007
WL 1541222 (statement of Tyson Slocum) ("While American families pay record high prices, oil
companies are enjoying the strongest profits in the economy.").
140. See, e.g., Consumer Reasonable Energy Price Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 1482, 111th Cong.
(2009) (redirecting "windfall profits" from crude oil and natural gas to the Low-Income Home Energy
Assistance Program.). During years in which the price of crude oil is higher, the number of bills
introduced also increases. See, e.g., Recapture Excess Profits and Invest in Roads and Roads and Rail
(REPAIR) Act, S. 2782, 110th Cong. (2008) (proposing to tax windfall profits of integrated oil
producers and direct the proceeds to the Highway Trust Fund.); Consumer-First Energy Act of 2008, S.
2991, 110th Cong. (2008) (imposing a windfall profits tax on major integrated oil producers, among
other provisions.); Energy Security & Corporate Accountability Act of 2007, S. 1238, 110th Cong.
(2007) (imposing a windfall profits tax on major integrated oil companies to fund biofuels research and
grant subsidies for low-income households.), Gas Price Spike Act of 2008, H.R. 6000, 110th Cong.
(2008) (imposing a windfall profits tax and granting subsidies for fuel-efficient vehicles and grants for
mass-transit.); Consumer Reasonable Energy Price Protection Act of 2008, H.R. 5800, 110th Cong.
(2008) (earlier version of H.R. 1482 in the 11 lth Congress.); WEAN Off of Oil Act of 2007, H.R. 2372,
110th Cong. (2007) (imposing a windfall profits tax to fund investments in renewable energy.).
141. See, e.g., Gas Price Spike Act of 2000, H.R. 4974, 106th Cong. (2000); Gas Price Spike Act of
2001, H.R. 1967, 107th Cong. (2001); National Defense of Oil Equity Act of 2003, H.R. 585 (2003);
Consumer Windfall Excess Oil Profits Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 4276, 109th Cong. (2005).
142. See J. Matthew Dow, The Windfall Profit Tax Exposed, 14 ST. MARY's L.J. 739, 741-42 (1983)
(detailing the history of domestic oil production following 1973 price controls that increased consump-
tion while international events were decreasing supply.).
143. Though one might argue that deregulation may be prudent in order to give producers market-
rate profits, the stated reason to let prices rise to global market levels was to encourage consumer
conservation. Therefore, increased profit for producers was not embraced as a positive consequence.
See id. at 741-42 (explaining that the 1980 WPTT was designed to recapture the Regulatory Windfall for
related governmental programs.).
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imposed the Crude Oil & Gas Windfall Profits Tax of 1980,145 which created a
temporary 146 excise tax of 11% on the additional portion of profits attributable
to the deregulation process. 
147
However, because of this precedent, legislators are quick to introduce legisla-
tion to tax "windfall" profits earned by oil and gas companies when prices rise due to
non-governmental forces such as changes in supply and changes in demand.
148
Without considering that these profits are Earned Windfalls, not Regulatory Windfalls,
these windfall profits taxes are not designed to capture some temporary undue benefit
caused by a shift from one governmental policy regime to another. In addition, these
taxes do not recognize the level of risk that oil companies accept in the marketplace,
particularly in exploration and production activities. 149 As such, these taxes are
much more likely to decrease competition in the industry and decrease incen-
tives to invest in innovation, new technologies and new production fields.
Historically, temporary "windfall profits" taxes levied during wars150 or other
crises are hard to repeal 51  and, as the 1980 windfall profits tax ("WPT")
teaches, easy to repeat. Therefore, regulators should use caution in implement-
ing economic restraints as a response to a temporary change in market forces.
152
2. Cap & Trade Allocation Regimes
In the congressional testimony dataset, the word "windfall" was used to refer
to certain parts of a proposed "cap and trade" regime for allocating pollution
144. See generally Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 47.
145. Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-233, 94 Stat. 229 (1976) (subsequently
repealed). See also United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74 (1983) (upholding the constitutionality of
the Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax.).
146. See Dow, supra note 142, at 745 (explaining that the 1980 WPT was to be phased out at the
later of January 1, 1988 or after $227.3 billion was collected from the tax.).
147. See Christy E. Milner, Resolving Producer/Interest Questions Under the Crude Oil Windfall
Profit Tax, 37 TAX. LAw. 607, 607 (1984) (relating that the 1980 WPT was part of a "multifaceted attempt at
economic regulation of the oil producing industry" designed to both "prevent oil producers from obtaining a
windfall from consumers" and "encourage oil conservation and domestic production.").
148. See Kades, supra note 22, at 1550-51 (explaining that windfall profits taxes should only be
justified when there is a true "surprise" or stark change in the landscape that is unpredictable, such as
the creation of OPEC, but not the continued existence of OPEC.).
149. See Dow, supra note 142, at 755 (arguing that the 1980 WPT would neutralize incentives for oil
producers and result in fewer jobs.).
150. Current conflicts are not immune from legislative proposals to institute war taxes. See Excess
War Profits Act of 2004, H.R. 4825, 108th Cong. (2004) (taxing contract profits in which the U.S.
government is a purchaser of goods or services for ihe war effort.).
151. See Kades, supra note 22, at 1538-41 (explaining that war profits taxes are difficult to tailor,
result in "excess profits" taxes that are unrelated to Regulatory Windfalls created by introducing the
government as a consumer and are difficult to repeal.).
152. Another target of legislation is to cap prices during natural disasters or tax excess profits from
these disasters. See Consumer-First Energy Act of 2008, S. 2991, 110th Cong. (2008) (prohibiting
charging an "unconscionably excessive price" during a declared emergency, which "represents an
exercise of unfair leverage or unconscionable means on the part of the seller."). This knee-jerk reaction
ignores the reality that the occurrence of many natural disasters are risks that are contemplated by those
who invest capital in areas prone to them and thus expose themselves to downside risk (property
damage and business interruption) and upside risk (increased demand for products).
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credits among energy producers thirty-four times in twenty-three pieces of
testimony. 153 Currently, the House of Representatives has passed the American
Clean Energy & Security Act of 2009,154 which would create a system of
emission allowances to be allocated to covered utilities; 5 5 once allocated, these
emission allowances may be sold, traded, 156 banked, borrowed, 157 or otherwise
transferred by these utilities among each other and to various other market
participants. 158 Approximately fifteen percent of initial allocations will be auc-
tioned, 159 with the proceeds directed toward renewable energy initiatives. In
addition, producers can earn additional allowances by making certain invest-
ments in "green" upgrades. 160 Offsets may also be purchased.66' The creation of
a system such as this, where players will be allocated some type of benefit to
either be utilized or traded as currency,162 automatically creates animosity
between different categories of players. 163 Though regulators may attempt to
eliminate any unnecessary or undeserved allocations, the tendency will be to
designate others' allocations as Regulatory Windfalls.
Some environmental critics argued that all allowances should be auctioned,
as these permits to pollute are assets of the public and not a part of the property
right of an existing emitter. 164 Others argue that certain regulated utilities should
be given additional allowances because they may have older technology and
may not be able to pass costs on to consumers in a regulated environment.
165
Cleaner emitters do not think that dirtier emitters should be given more allow-
153. See Tables V-1 and V-2, supra. This dataset from 2007 contains testimony gathered by
legislators during preliminary consideration of draft legislation from the 110th Congress. See S. 280,
110th Cong. (2007).
154. H.R. 2454, lllth Cong. (2009). See also Greg Hitt & Stephen Power, House Passes Climate
Bill, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2009, at Al (noting that the bill passed by the narrow margin of 219-212.).
155. H.R. 2454 § 782.
156. Id. § 724.
157. Id. § 725.
158. This Article does not wade into the debate over the costs and benefits over the proposed law or
its contribution to any stated environmental goals. This Article is merely interested in the windfall
rhetoric employed by supporters and critics of this proposed law.
159. H.R. 2454 § 726.
160. See id. § 721(f).
161. See id. § 732.
162. See Editorial, Waxman-Markey: Action on Climate Change is Overdue. But is This the Best We
Can Hope For?, WASH. POST, June 26, 2009. ('The result is a 1,201-page measure filled with political
compromises, directives, subsidies and selections of winners and losers .... ").
163. See Cass R. Sunstein, Some Effects of Moral Indignation on Law, 33 VT. L. Rev. 405, 419-20
(2009) (explaining how some critics of cap and trade regimes express outrage based on a heuristic that
people should not be paid for agreeing not to pollute or be able to pay for the privilege.).
164. See Global Warming Legislation: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Env't. & Pub. Works, 110th
Cong. (2007) (statement of David Hawkins) ("The current bill's allocation to electrical power and
industrial emitters, however, is still much higher than justified under "hold harmless" principles and
will result in windfall profits to the shareholders of emitters.").
165. See id. (statement of Donald R. Rowlett) ("In addition, while there are certainly advocates of
auctioning all the allowances who will criticize the number of allowances distributed through § 3903 as
excessive or as a "windfall," we strongly disagree.").
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ances to transition them to cleaner technologies. 166 Emitters that rely on fossil
fuels do not believe that cleaner emitters should get any allowances. 16 7 Emitters
that recently made expensive upgrades want consideration for those upgrades,
which would have been due if they had waited until passage of the law. 168
Others accuse some utilities of changing technologies before passage of the bill
just to be grandfathered in.169 Though all of these groups disagree, they all
agree that some other group is receiving a windfall under the ACES Act.
C. Windfalls as Indirect Defeats
The sinister aspect of windfall rhetoric is the inability of critics to enjoy or
tolerate another's excess windfall. If the critic is the payee or sympathetic to the
payee, then this disdain is understandable, but often this is not the case. Hearing
of the success of lottery winners, real estate sellers or founders of start-up
companies seems not to engender happiness, even if the observer has lost
nothing in connection with others' gain. In an entrepreneurial society, one
would imagine that the success of others would inspire observers to emulate
that success and not seek to eliminate it. However, various studies have shown
that in simulations, subjects are quite willing to reduce the wealth of others,
even if that decision requires subjects to forego their own wealth. 170 The
"ultimatum game" is a quintessential experiment in game theory in which one
participant offers to split a pot of money with another participant. In the original
version of the ultimatum game, there is only one round of one offer. A rational
respondent should accept any non-zero offer; however, studies have shown that
respondents tend not to accept offers in which they receive less than the
166. See Power Plants & Global Warming Issues: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Env't & Pub. Works,
June 28, 2007, available at 2007 WL 1874574 (statement of Lewis Hay) (arguing, as the largest
wind-energy producer, that most cap-and-trade regimes overallocate allowances to the highest carbon
producers, creating a "windfall.").
167. See Advanced Coal Technology: Hearing before the H. Select Comm. on Energy Independence
&. Global Warming, Sept. 6, 2007, available at 2007 WL 2683384 (statement of Michael G. Morriss)
(arguing, as a representative of a coal-fired electricity generator, that although 95% of allowances
should be allocated, allocating tradable allowances to companies with nuclear or natural gas generation
would be a "windfall.").
168. See Power Plants & Global Warming Issues: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Env. & Pub. Works,
supra note 166 (statement of Peter Darbee) (arguing that PG & E should get credit for recent initiatives
and the allocating allowances should not create "unintended windfalls" by compensating companies for
more than their costs of compliance.).
169. See id. (statement of Marlo Lewis) (presenting a hypothetical in which Duke Energy receives
credit for "early action" and would "reap a windfall profit of between 170 percent and 712 percent.").
170. See, e.g., Andrew Oswald & Daniel Zizzo, Are People Willing to Pay to Reduce Others'
Incomes?, ANNALES D'EcoNoMm Er DE STATISTIQUE 39 (2001) (describing a study in which participants
engaged in an anonymous computer betting game in which they could see the winning totals of the
other players and choose to eliminate the others' winnings by forfeiting their own.). According to
Oswald and Zizzo's study, two-thirds of subjects chose to "burn" the other players' winnings, even
though their own winnings were reduced by some percentage in return. Findings suggested not only
that the wealth of the opponent was significant to the player's decision, but also whether the player
perceived the opponents winnings as deserved.
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offeror.t7 '
1. Executive Compensation
Compensation paid to executives of a corporation, particularly a publicly-
held corporation, is generally a very small part of a corporation's budget, yet
these salaries get substantial media attention. 172 By no stretch of the imagina-
tion are these compensation packages zero-sum defeats for employees, sharehold-
ers 17 3 or even taxpayers, who receive the benefits of the highest tax rates being
levied on these highly-paid individuals. If boards of directors paid executives
less, the benefit per employee or per shareholder of a publicly-held corporation
would be negligible. However, knowledge of highly paid executives, particu-
larly when the companies they lead are not successful, leads to outrage from the
public at large.1 74 Critics remind us that in other countries,175 executives are not
paid so much more than "rank and file" employees and urge us to curb this trend
and reduce the gap between the highest and lowest salaries in publicly-held corpora-
tions. Income disparity is a rallying cry for politicians, though economists are
quick to warn that income disparity is only part of an economic picture. 176
Traditionally, reformers have argued that executive compensation plans should
171. See Elizabeth Hoffman & Kevin McCabe, Preferences and Property Rights in Ultimatum and
Dictator Games, in HANDBOOK OF ExPEnmiENrAL ECONOMIcs RESULTS (Charles R. Plott and Vernon L.
Smith, eds. 2008); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law
& Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1489-91 (1998).
172. A recent high-profile lawsuit involved Michael Ovitz's $130 million severance package when
he was terminated as the President of The Walt Disney Company after sixteen months. In re the Walt
Disney Company Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). The Supreme Court of Delaware
determined that the Board of Directors had not breached any fiduciary duties by either hiring Ovitz
.under those terms, by terminating him without cause, or by paying him what was due under the
contract. Id. In so holding, Justice Jacobs points out that the day Ovitz's hiring was announced, Disney
common stock rose 4.4 %, or $1 billion. See id. at 40. In addition to the $130 million package seeming
not unreasonable due to both the effect on share price, during the fiscal year 1996, Disney reported
revenues of $18.7 billion and costs and expenditures (of which salary is a part) of $15.4 billion. See The
Walt Disney Corporation, Fact Book 1996 (1996) (Consolidated Statement of Income for fiscal year
ended July 30, 1996).
173. But see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the
Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647, 652 (2005) (arguing that, in the aggregate, curbing excessive managerial pay
"would have a discernible effect on corporate earnings," but arguing that more importantly, excessive
compensation distorts managerial incentives.).
174. See Posting of David A. Katz to The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and
Financial Regulation, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/07/28/populist-wish-lists-offer-egisative-
parade-of-horribles/#more-2824 (July 28, 2009, 10:24 EST) ("Executive pay has long been a touch-
stone for debate and an easy target for populist-minded reformers.").
175. See Cait Murphy, Are the Rich Cleaning Up? FORT NE, Sept. 4, 2000, at 252 ("America's
lowest-paid workers make less, as a percentage of the median wage... than their counterparts in any
other country.").
176. See Inequality in America: The Rich are the Big Gainers in America's New Prosperity, THE
EcoNONMsT, June 17, 2006 (positing that though Americans were generally content to let the rich get
richer and just dream of getting rich, rising income disparity after 2000 is eroding that optimism.);
Murphy, supra note 175, at 252 (suggesting that ameliorating the problems of the bottom quartile is
better policy than pillaging the top quartile to raise overall economic health.).
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be well-tailored in order to incentivize good performance from executives;
bloated pay packages without well-articulated goals or those that focus only on
short-term benchmarks may lead to poor leadership or satisfaction with the
status quo.17 7 Recently, new arguments blame executive compensation that
incentivizes risk-seeking behavior for increasing systemic risk and causing the
2008 financial crisis. 178 However, most proposed reforms are not applying
pruning shears to executive compensation, but proposing broad sets of rules
applicable to heterogeneous groups of companies. 
179
2. U.S. Government as Creditor: TARP Funds & Executive Compensation
Recently, the federal government has taken a substantial interest in executive
compensation and proposed reforms through both the Treasury Department and
the Securities Exchange Commission. In 2008, a number of financial institu-
tions received an influx of capital, mostly direct investment, from the U.S.
Treasury under a program named the "Troubled Asset Relief Program"
("TARP").180 Following this taxpayer "bailout," the public was outraged to hear
that executives from those same institutions would continue to receive large
salaries and bonuses, 181 some pursuant to pre-existing contracts.182 In response
to this outrage, newly inaugurated President Barack Obama urged Treasury to
177. See LucIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHoUT PERFORMANcE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE
OF ExECtrnVE COMPENSATION (Harvard Univ. Press 2004) (presenting executive compensation as not the
result of arms-length contracting but the result of managerial power, at the expense of shareholders,
creating perverse incentives to, among other things, commit fraud.).
178. See Gretchen Morgenson, Imperfect Politics of Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2009, at C1 (suggest-
ing that H.R. 3269 is "supposed to correct wrongheaded structures that generated untold millions for
aggressive managers and monster losses for unwitting taxpayers."); Editorial, Their Gamble, Every-
one's Money, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2009, at A14 ("many Americans are understandably furious about the
colossal bonuses making a comeback at JPMorgan Chase and Goldman Sachs while millions of people
around the world are still suffering because of Wall Street's recklessness.").
'179. See Posting of Gordon Smith to Conglomerate, http://www.theconglomerate.org/2009/08/
executive-compensation-our-incoherent-hearts-desires.html (Aug. 3, 2009) (last visited Apr. 11, 2010)
("In effect, we want to have the world so arranged that every executive will be motivated to take the
risks necessary to achieve long-term profitability, but that no company will have to lose money as a_
result of excessive risk taking. But the payoff for the former necessitates, indeed entails, the latter.
Hence doing both is not a technical problem - how do you define "pay for performance," how do you
specify excessive risk taking in a short statute - but acultural one: we cannot have perfect profitability
and perfect risk-taking at once. What we have, instead, is a crazy quilt of regulations of executive
compensation that allows us, inconsistently, and with only symbolic impact, an occasional evasive bow
in the direction of our incoherent hearts' desires.")
180. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 et seq. (Oct.
3, 2008).
181. See H. Res. 76, lllth Cong. (2009) ("[e]xpressing the sense of the Congress regarding
executive and employee bonuses paid by AIG and other companies assisted with [TARP] funds" and
asking President Obama to ask that AIG employees either forego such bonuses or repay the "hundreds
of millions of dollars" AIG paid to such employees.).
182. See David Segal, $100 Million Payday Poses Problem for Pay Czar, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2009,
at Al (reporting that Andrew J. Hall, a commodities trader who earned Citigroup $2 billion in the last
two years speculating in the energy market, may not receive his $100 million bonus due under his
contract because of federal scrutiny of exequtive pay at bailout recipients like Citigroup.).
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impose caps on executive compensation paid by companies that received "excep-
tional financial recovery assistance" from the U.S. government.' 83 Though
companies receiving TARP funds were already not allowed to deduct salaries
above $500,000 for federal income tax purposes, the new plan flatly prohibited
salaries above $500,000.14 The Treasury Department also appointed a "pay
czar" to scrutinize executive compensation at the seven largest firms that have
not repaid any TARP funds.
1 85
The desire by a lender to curb excessive and unnecessary spending by a
borrower, particularly a risky borrower, is prudent. Commercial lenders and
bondholders monitor spending in various ways: limiting capital expenditures,
limiting dividends and other disbursements, and requiring borrowers to meet
certain financial ratios. However, most lenders understand that the people
running the business are better equipped to make decisions about hiring and
salaries in their particular industries and markets for talent. Here, the federal
government is ignoring the market for corporate executives and risking these
troubled companies losing talented executives. 18 6 Even if all the senior execu-
tives at these troubled companies were incompetent,1 87 the companies will face
challenges recruiting new executives to join a troubled firm without adequate
compensation for taking the career risk. 188 However, the new regulation reacted
not to economic reality but to populism. As President Obama said, these executives
were "shameful" for "living high on the hog" after receiving assistance.1 89
The February 2009 Treasury Regulations were not the only reforms aimed at
curbing the perceived excess compensation at TARP firms. Congress also
moved to propose legislation to create a Commission on Executive Compensa-
183. See Edmund L. Andrews & Vikas Bajaj, U.S. Plans $500,000 Cap On Executive Pay in
Bailouts, N.Y. TisEs, Feb. 4, 2009, at Al (noting that executives at some of the most unhealthy
companies receiving TARP funds received large salaries in 2007, including the chief executive of
General Motors, who received a package of $14.4 million, $1.6 million of which was salary.).
184. See Press Release, Treasury Announces New Restrictions on Executive Compensation, avail-
able at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/tgl5.htm (last visited August 10, 2009) [hereinafter
Treasury Restrictions] (requiring that executive compensation also be subject to a "say on pay"
shareholder resolution and prohibiting the top 25 highest-paid executives from receiving any "golden
parachutes" while any TARP funds remain outstanding.).
185. See Stephen Labaton, Treasury to Set Executives'Pay at 7 Ailing Firms, N.Y. TMES, June 10, 2009, at
Al (naming Kenneth R. Feinberg as the pay czar to oversee compensation packages at AIG, Citigroup, Bank of
America, General Motors, Chrysler and the financing arms of the two motor companies.).
186. Even Professor Bebchuk has testified that at least for non-financial firms, "the government
should not seek to limit the substantive arrangements from which private decisionmakers may choose."
See Compensation Structure & Systemic Risk: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 2009 WL
1628404 (statement of Lucian A. Bebchuk).
187. See Andrews & Bajaj, supra note 183, at 1 (noting that most of the companies that received
TARP funds were" 'healthy' rather than on the brink of collapse.").
188. See Posting of Larry Ribstein to Ideoblog, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2009/02/
the-stupid-bailout-pay-caps.html (Feb. 4, 2009, 10:59 CST) ("Note that this proposal applies not just to
the executives who messed up, but to new hires that might lift the firms out of their morass. It therefore
not only doesn't focus on the bad, but helps free them from competition in the executive talent
market.").
189. See id.
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tion that would define and prohibit "unreasonable or excessive" compensation
for any financial institution that received TARP funds.190 The House of Represen-
tatives passed this legislation on April 1, 2009.'9' Not surprisingly, ten of the
largest financial institutions receiving TARP funds asked to repay their infusions
in April 2009, and were granted permission to repay in June 2009,192 possibly
sacrificing the benefits of the government stimulus.
3. U.S. Government as Super Shareholder: To TARP and Beyond
However, the government's new interest in executive compensation did not
end there, and in fact its interest officially began there. In the same plan that set
limitations on executive salary for TARP companies, Treasury announced that it
was taking a look at executive compensation at all corporations and looking
forward to new, broader regulation under the heading "Long-Term Regulatory
Reform: Compensation Strategies Aligned with Proper Risk Management and
Long-Term Value and Growth." 193 Recently, legislation has been introduced to
regulate executive compensation at all publicly-held companies, including the
Excessive Pay Shareholder Approval Act1 94 and the Corporate and Financial
Institution Compensation Fairness Act (the "Compensation Fairness" Act).
19 5
The Excessive Pay Shareholder Approval Act would require a vote of 60% of
the shareholders of an issuer before that issuer could pay an employee more
than "an amount equal to 100 times the average compensation for services
performed by all employees of that issuer during such taxable year.'
196
The Compensation Fairness Act ("CFA"), passed by the House of Representa-
tives on July 31, 2009,197 amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to
require independent compensation committees and shareholder "advisory" vot-
ing on executive compensation. 198 In addition, the CFA would also give power
to "appropriate Federal regulators" to promulgate regulations that prohibit any
incentive-based payment arrangement, or any feature of any such arrangement,
190. See H.R. 1664, 111 th Cong. (2009) (enabling the Commission to establish "performance-based
measures" to determine what is unreasonable excessive, including "the performance of the individual,"
"adherence... to appropriate risk management requirements," and "other standards which provide
greater accountability to shareholders and taxpayers.").
191. 155 CoNG. REc. H4310 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 2009).
192. See Robin Sidel & Deborah Solomon, Treasury Lets 10 Banks Repay $68 Billion in Bailout
Cash, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2009, at A4 (noting that by repaying the government funds, these
institutions avoid the February Treasury restrictions on pay as well as the supervision of the pay czar,
appointed the same week the banks were allowed to repay their funds.).
193. See Treasury Restrictions, supra note 184.
194. S. 1006, 111th Cong. (2009).
195. Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 3269, lllth
Cong. (2009).
196. See S. 1006, 111 th Cong. § 2 (2009) (amending the Securities Exchange Act at Section 16).
197. 155 CONG. REc. H9243 (July 31, 2009).
198. See H.R. 3269, 111th Cong. § 2(i)(1) (2009) ("The shareholder vote shall not be binding on the
issuer or the board of directors and shall not be construed as overruling a decision by such board, nor to
create or imply any additional fiduciary duty by such board ....").
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that the regulators determine encourages inappropriate risks by covered finan-
cial institutions that (1) could threaten the safety and soundness of covered
financial institutions; or (2) could have serious adverse effects on economic
conditions or financial stability.' 99
Contrary to earlier arguments that shareholders should have a "say on pay,"
here financial institutions would be limited as to crafting executive compensa-
tion with or without shareholder approval. Government regulation here is a final
veto to independent compensation committees and risk-seeking, well-diversified
shareholders. 2° In addition, the Compensation Fairness Act only gives lip
service to shareholder power by giving shareholders a megaphone, but not a
binding vote,2°1 and does nothing to encourage thoughtful tailoring of compensa-
tion plans. Notably, this bill was passed by the House ten days after its
introduction, but just one day after media reports that nine firms receiving
TARP money paid out tens of billions in bonuses in 2008.202
Populism also seems to be driving the Excessive Compensation Act, which
limits compensation not subject to shareholder vote based on the gap between
the compensation and the "rank and file" compensation. 0 3 Though this senti-
ment may resonate with the voting public,2° it furthers neither shareholder
power goals nor systemic risk goals. Many of the 2009 legislative proposals
were included as part of a larger piece of regulatory reform entitled Restoring
American Financial Stability Act of 2010. This Act was passed by the Senate in
May 2010, and as of the time of this writing, awaits action by the President of
the United States. This Act addresses many areas thought to have contributed to
the financial crisis, including the banking industry, derivatives and credit rating
199. See id. § 4 ("Enhanced Compensation Structure Reporting to Reduce Perverse Incentives.").
200. See Lucian Bebchuk, Regulate Financial Pay to Reduce Risk-Taking, FT.coM, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e34d6d4e-8058-1 lde-bfO4-00144feabdc.html?nclickcheck= 1 (Aug. 3,
2009) (last visited Aug. 10, 2009) (responding to arguments that shareholders should have the say in
how their investments are spent by saying "[gliven the government's interest in financial companies'
stability, intervention in pay structures is as legitimate as the traditional forms of financial regulation.").
201. See Morgenson, supra note 178 (commenting that the nonbinding shareholder vote on compen-
sation was created by the "make-work department" and that it was doubtful "that regulators are savvy
enough about both pay packages and risky compensation incentives at financial companies to recognize
when either or both have become dysfunctional.").
202. See Susanne Craig & Deborah Solomon, Bank Bonus Tab: $33 Billion, WALL ST. J., July 31,
2009, at Al (analyzing report that nine TARP banks paid out $33 billion in bonuses in 2008, including
4,800 bonuses of more than $1 million each); see also Andrea Fuller, House Approves Limits on
Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2009, at AI ("The passage of the bill [on Friday] comes after news
on Thursday that companies receiving bailout money had paid bonuses of more than $1 million each to
thousands of their employees for 2008.").
203. A related legislative proposal would reduce the deductibility of executive compensation by
employers from $1 million to "the greater of (i) an amount equal to 25 times the lowest compensation
for services performed by any other full-time employee during such taxable year, or (ii) $500,000."
H.R. 1594, 111 th Cong. (2009) (referred to the House Ways and Means Committee on March 3, 2009).
204. See Stephen Labaton, House Panel Approves Executive Pay Restraints, N.Y. TimEs, July 29,
2009 at Al (quoting Rep. Spencer T. Bachus i (R-AL), who was against H.R. 3269, as saying "'I said
doing something about executive compensation would be very popular with the American people .... I
said opposing this would put our members in a very difficult position."').
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agencies. In addition, Section 951 requires publicly-held companies to disclose
executive compensation to shareholders and, on an annual basis, allow for a
nonbinding vote on executive compensation.2 °5
The recent regulatory focus on executive compensation may be an effort to
capitalize on the financial crisis by limiting executive pay under the guise of
systemic risk reform.20 6 This new connection between executive compensation
and systemic risk,207 however, may be little more than a pretextual argument
that belies a public fixation on executive compensation borne out of populist
envy and spite. Broad prohibitions and caps do not allow companies to tailor
executive incentives to share in both the "upside" and the "downside" as the
pay-for-performance rhetoric seems to crave, 20 8 and legislation seems bound to
give shareholders toothless rights with no remedies. 20 9 Finally, whether federal
regulators will be able to reduce global systemic risk by identifying and
prohibiting the compensation practice culprits seems doubtful.
4. Speculators
Another example of an economic gain to an unrelated party that seems to
inspire envy and scorn is a gain earned in the stock market, particularly one that
is seen as short-term speculation, and even worse, negative short-term specula-
tion, or short-selling.2 0 In corporate finance literature, speculation is distin-
guished from hedging: contract parties that have downside risk due to the price
of fuel oil, for example, will hedge that vulnerability by purchasing a future in
fuel oil or even stock in (or an option on the stock of) a fuel oil producer.21
This type of hedge reduces a party's overall risk profile and is seen as quite
prudent. 212 A party engages in speculation, however, by entering into a futures
transaction or other investment without an offsetting obligation, increasing the
205. See Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, H.R. 4173, 1 l1th Cong. (2010).
206. See Ameet Sachdev, CEO Pay: Shareholders Yearning for a Say, Cm. TRIB., May 24, 2009, at
C1 (quoting Michael Melbinger, partner at Winston & Strawn as saying "We've been telling clients,
"You should look at TARP as a blueprint for what will roll out to the rest of corporate America" relating
to executive compensation).
207. Another regulatory option to curb excessive executive compensation is to mandate disclosure.
Though the SEC amended Item 410 of Regulation S-K in 2006 to increase disclosure, a proposed rule
by the SEC would mandate additional disclosures of "overall compensation policies and their impact on
risk taking." See 74 Fed. Reg. H35076 (July 17, 2009) (soliciting comments until September 15, 2009).
208. See Segal, supra note 182, at A1 (noting that Mr. Hall's $100 million contract rewarded him for
bringing $2 billion in profit to Citigroup.).
209. See Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, H.R. 4173, 11lth Cong. § 951 (2010)
(specifically providing that the nonbinding shareholder vote does not "create or imply any additional
fiduciary duty by such board.").
210. Two recent books explore the arguably negative impact of the "financialization" of the U.S.
economy. See Niall Ferguson, The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World (2008);
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Speculation Economy: How Finance Triumphed Over Industry (2008).
211. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BooTH, CoRPOATE FINANCE (2001) 547-48 (detailing
the history of commodities futures trading).
212. But see Ken Belson, Some Who Locked In a Price For Heating Oil Now Wish They Hadn't,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 23, 2008, at A27 (noting that because heating oil prices decreased in 2008, those who
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party's overall risk profile. Some argue that speculators create too much risk for
their own portfolios and also move prices away from fundamental values in
capital markets. However, others argue that speculators are necessary to provide
counterparties for hedgers and otherwise provide liquidity.
At some basic level, most investors are speculators. Households that own
McDonald's stock do so without any offsetting position that will increase in
value as the share price of McDonald's drops.213 Notwithstanding its specula-
tive nature, this type of long-term investment is generally seen as prudent,
though it technically does not add to the working capital of McDonald's,
provide jobs, or add to the GDP. However, large returns on investments,
particularly over a short period, are often the targets of windfall terminology. In
the media dataset, the term "windfall" was used to refer to investing gains
(Securities (Investing)) twenty-three times in 233 articles. l4 Investors in real
estate may also be seen as speculators, or "flippers," if their interest is short-
term. In fact, the media dataset revealed that the term "windfall" was used to
refer to real estate gains in fourteen articles.215
As in executive compensation, individuals are generally not affected by
speculators' returns from their activities. However, recently, much criticism has
been directed at speculators in financial derivatives 21 6 and their role in the
financial crisis.2 17 In addition, speculators in commodities who are not in the
particular industry are seen as creating price volatility in oil and even in food.2 18
Hedge funds, which employ many short-term strategies, are another target of
speculator envy. The term "speculator" has taken on so much drama that
President Obama, frustrated at bondholders of Chrysler who would not agree to
a discounted principal so that Chrysler could avoid bankruptcy, called them
"speculators" and announced, "I don't stand with them. 21 9
Since 2008, Congress has introduced several pieces of legislation targeting
locked in a price were protected from potential price increases, but do not get the benefit of the lower
oil prices.).
213. A "fully diversified" investor is seen to have hedged overall risk somewhat by investing in various
types of issuers and various types of investments. However, this type of shareholder diversification is usually
just refraining from putting all of one's eggs in one basket, not really hedging offsetting risks.
214. See Table 111-1 and 111-3, supra.
215. See Table 111-1 and Table 111-3, supra.
216. See HAM.uTON & BOOTH, supra note 211, at 550 (introducing a discussion of discussions by
stating that "[clontroversy always accompanies great financial gains or losses," and that derivatives
provide both.).
217. See Lynn A. Stout, How Deregulating Derivatives Led to Disaster, and Why Re-Regulating
Them Can Prevent Another (UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 09-13), available at
http://ssrn.conabstract= 1432654 (arguing that the ability of parties to make "speculative wagers on
prices" in the commodities markets without "a real position in the underlying asset" was the cause of
the 2008 financial crisis.).
218. See Edmund L. Andrews, Call to Curb Speculators in Energy, N.Y. Tws, July 29, 2009, at B4
(quoting an industry participant as blaming increases in volatility of oil prices with "a massive increase
in speculative investment in oil futures.").
219. See Andrew Leonard, Obama: Chrysler's Bankruptcy Caused by Hedge Fund Speculators,
SALON, Apr. 30, 2009, http:l/www.salon.comltechlhtww/2009/04/30/obama-and-chrysler/index.html.
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speculators in various industries. The Derivatives Markets Transparency and
Accountability Act of 2009 directs the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion to record data on among other things, "speculative positions relative to
bona fide physical hedgers" and to impose position limits when necessary.2 2 0
Treasury has also proposed sweeping legislation to regulate derivatives mar-
kets. 22 ' The Prevent Excessive Speculation Act gives the CFI'C authority to set
position limits in energy and agricultural commodities.22 2 The Securities Ex-
change Commission has also issued new rules targeting short-selling specula-
223 2tors.  In addition, some critics have proposed a tax on speculation.2 a
CONCLUSION
Although kindergarten teachers everywhere tell us that words will never hurt
anyone, the word "windfall" has great rhetorical power. By mischaracterizing
gains as windfalls, various groups may be able to influence lawmakers to
regulate what this Article has referred to as Excess Earned Windfalls. Federal
law should not be hijacked into a type of simulated game where participants get
to vote to eliminate the gains of those winners they perceive as having too much
wealth or too much undeserved wealth. Regulation by envy or jealousy is not
legitimate.22 5
Moreover, regulation of perceived excess windfalls may have negative conse-
quences of stifling entrepreneurship, innovation and other valuable economic
activity. Apologists for eliminating windfalls would argue that redistributing
gains that are the consequence of luck is a cheap way to finance public welfare
without disincentivizing work. However, these marketplace gains that are sub-
ject to windfall rhetoric are the consequence of hard work combined with luck.
This Article argues that allowing recipients to reap the rewards of returns
composed of a mixture of work and luck is a cheap way to incentivize work.
220. See H.R. 977, 111th Cong. (2009).
221. See Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Administration's Regulatory Reform
Agenda Reaches New Milestone: Final Piece of Legislative Language Delivered to Capitol Hill (Aug.
11, 2009) ("Enormous risks built up in these markets [for credit default swaps and other OTC
derivatives] and these risks contributed t6 the collapse of major financial firms in the past year and
severe stress throughout the financial system.").
222. See S. 447, 111th Cong. (2009).
223. See "Naked" Short Selling Antifraud Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 58,774, 17 C.F.R. 240 (Oct. 17,
2008); Amendments to SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 60,388, 17 C.FR. 200 and 242 (Oct. 17,2008).
224. See e.g., Adam Rosenzweig, Imperfect Financial Markets and the Hidden Costs of a Modern
Income Tax, 62 SMU L. REV. 239 (2009) (arguing that the existing tax regime encourages speculation
and proposing a derivatives transaction tax).
225. See Sunstein, supra note 163, at 406 (explaining how indignation leads to moral dumbfounded-
ness and bad regulation).
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